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Conventional wisdom holds that federal laws conferring banking powers on 
national banks presumptively preempt state laws seeking to control the exercise of 
those powers. This conventional wisdom originates with McCulloch v. Maryland, 
which established that nationally chartered banks are federal instrumentalities entitled 
to regulate themselves free from state law—even when national law fails to address 
the risks that state law seeks to regulate. Incorporated into the National Bank Act of 
1864 by nineteenth-century precedents but then abandoned by the New Deal 
Court, McCulloch’s theory of preemption is being revived today by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) to preempt broad swaths of state law. 
This Article maintains that it is time to exorcise McCulloch’s theory from our 
preemption jurisprudence. Far from historically sanctioned, McCulloch’s theory 
that national banks are federal instrumentalities offends a deeply rooted tradition in 
American political culture and law that I call the “anti-banker nondelegation 
doctrine.” This principle has been manifest in campaigns against national banks’ 
immunities from political oversight, ranging from Andrew Jackson’s 1832 veto of 
the charter of the Second Bank of the United States to Louis Brandeis’s 1912 
campaign against the “House of Morgan” as a “financial oligarchy.” In contrast to 
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McCulloch’s view of banks as impartial instruments of the federal government, the 
American political system and the post–New Deal federal courts have adopted the 
view that federal law should not delegate unsupervised power to private banks to 
regulate their own operations. Accordingly, if federal regulators displace state laws 
regulating banking practices, then those federal regulators must explain how federal 
law addresses the risks that those state laws were attempting to control. 
The most recent effort to eliminate McCulloch’s theory of preemption is section 
1044(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 1044(a) provides detailed standards 
governing the OCC’s power to preempt state law. This Article argues that the 
OCC’s 2011 rules mistakenly revive McCulloch’s theory of preemption. This revival 
contradicts not only section 1044(a); it also contravenes the general tradition of 
distrusting grants to national banks of immunity from state law. Like McCulloch, 
the OCC’s rules draw irrational distinctions between states’ general common law 
doctrines and states’ rules specifically directed toward banking practices, and subject 
the latter to a sort of field preemption. This Article contends that such preemption is 
unprincipled and mistaken. Instead, it urges courts to follow the ordinary principles 
of conflict preemption—that is, to find state law preempted only where the OCC has 
specifically approved the banking practice forbidden by state law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The federal courts seem to assume a long, unbroken historical consensus 
that nationally chartered banks ought to be governed by the federal govern-
ment to the exclusion of state regulation. Since the Supreme Court handed 
down McCulloch v. Maryland,1 judges and scholars have commonly declared 
that “history” has called for centralized law governing nationally chartered 
banks. As Justice Breyer described preemption of state law under federal 
laws conferring powers on banks in Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson: 
In using the word “powers,” the [National Bank Act] chooses a legal concept 
that, in the context of national bank legislation, has a history. That history is 
one of interpreting grants of both enumerated and incidental “powers” to 
national banks as grants of authority not normally limited by, but rather 
ordinarily pre-empting, contrary state law.2 
This “history,” according to Justice Breyer, requires the presumption 
that “normally Congress would not want States to forbid, or to impair 
significantly, the exercise of a power that Congress explicitly granted.”3 
Thus, there should be no need for judicial straining to figure out a way for 
state and federal law to coexist. If a bank is authorized by federal law to do 
something, then that bank’s authorization preempts any state law that 
 
1 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
2 517 U.S. 25, 32 (1996). 
3 Id. at 33. 
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interferes with a banking power “that Congress explicitly granted”—even if 
the state law in question is neutral and does not discriminate against 
national banks. As Jamelle Sharpe describes the doctrine, courts review 
state regulation of national banks under a “Centralization Default,”4 derived 
from an alleged jurisprudential tradition of regarding state control of 
nationally chartered banks with suspicion. 
The idea that American history implies this sort of “Centralization De-
fault” has been defended administratively, as well. Consider, as an example 
of administrative reliance on alleged historical consensus, the justification for 
the preemption rules issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC) in the summer of 2011.5 The OCC’s rules construed the Dodd-Frank 
Act’s preemption clauses—which provide that a state consumer financial law 
is preempted, even if such a law does not single out nationally chartered 
banks for discriminatory treatment, if the state law “prevents or significantly 
interferes with the exercise by the national bank of its powers”6—as expressly 
codifying Barnett Bank’s preemption standard.7 Despite the reference to 
Barnett Bank, one might reasonably infer that this clause was intended to cut 
back on preemption of state law. After all, it contains unusual requirements 
that the OCC support preemption by making a “specific finding,”8 on a “case-
by-case basis,”9 supported by “substantial evidence, made on the record of 
the proceeding.”10 Furthermore, the clause provides only Skidmore—not 
Chevron—deference for agency preemption findings, and it expressly bars 
field preemption.11 How could such unusually specific statutory admonitions 
not be an effort to trim back on the preemption status quo? 
 
4 Jamelle C. Sharpe, Legislating Preemption, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 163, 172 (2011). 
5 See Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 43,549, 43,554 (July 21, 2011). 
6 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B) (2006, Supp. IV 2011). 
7 Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 
43,556. 
8 Id. § 25b(c). 
9 Id. § 25b(b)(1)(B). 
10 Id. § 25b(c). 
11 Compare id. § 25b(b)(5)(A) (“A court reviewing any [agency] determinations . . . shall 
assess the validity of such determinations, depending on the thoroughness evident in the 
consideration of the agency, the validity of the reasoning of the agency, the consistency with other 
valid determinations made by the agency, and other factors which the court finds persuasive and 
relevant to its decision.”), with Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“The weight of 
[an administrator’s] judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, 
and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”), and Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) (holding that courts 
must defer to “an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers,” so long as the agency’s 
regulations are “based on a permissible construction of the statute”). 
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Yet the OCC reissued its 2004, pre–Dodd-Frank rules in almost identical 
terms in the summer of 2011.12 Despite disavowing field preemption,13 the 
OCC declared once more that nationally chartered banks may make non–
real estate loans “without regard to state-law limitations concerning” a 
broad array of topics.14 George W. Madison, the Department of Treasury’s 
General Counsel, bluntly criticized the 2011 rule for “seem[ing] to take the 
position that the Dodd-Frank standard has no effect.”15 In response, the 
OCC predictably trotted out the argument from history: broad preemption 
had been a “pillar[]” of banking law for “nearly 150 years.”16 Broad pre-
emption, the OCC argued, provided the uniformity of regulation necessary 
to promote a national market in financial services that would guarantee 
“prosperity and growth.”17  
The OCC also argued that nationally uniform rules were suggested not 
only by historical practice but also by the national scale of the financial 
services market. Technological change (e.g., Internet banking), legal change 
(e.g., the authorization of interstate bank branching), and increased mobility 
of consumers caused “[m]arkets for credit (both consumer and commercial), 
deposits, and many other financial products and services” to become 
“national, if not international, in scope.”18 Such national markets required 
“consistent, national standards, regardless of the location of a customer when 
he or she first becomes a bank customer or the location to which the customer 
may move after becoming a bank customer.”19 “[D]iverse and potentially 
conflicting state and local laws” raise compliance costs, and “national banks 
must either absorb the costs, pass the costs on to consumers, or eliminate 
various products from jurisdictions where the costs are prohibitive.”20 
 
12 Compare Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 
Fed. Reg. at 43,565-66, with Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1895, 1904 (Jan. 13, 
2004), and Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 
1904, 1916-17 (Jan. 13, 2004). These preemption rules, as amended in 2011, are codified at 12 C.F.R. 
pt. 7, subpt. D (2012). 
13 See infra notes 274-77 and accompanying text. 
14 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008(d). The topics included state law requirements regarding, inter alia, 
licensing, registration, creditors’ insurance requirements, loan-to-value ratios, terms of credit, and 
access to credit reports. Id. 
15 Letter from George W. Madison, General Counsel, Dep’t of the Treasury, to John Walsh, 
Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 2 (June 27, 2011), 
available at http://cdn.americanbanker.com/media/pdfs/TreasuryOCC_062811.pdf. 
16 Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed. Reg. 
43,549, 43,554 (July 21, 2011). 
17 Id. 
18 Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 
1907 (Jan. 13, 2004). 
19 Id. at 1908. 
20 Id. 
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In sum, the OCC has justified its preemption rule with a combination of 
historical precedent and alleged economies of scale achieved by having one 
set of uniform rules for a national industry. In this Article, I argue that the 
breadth of the OCC’s rule defies both its historical and its policy-based 
justifications. The OCC’s rule preempts state banking laws without making 
any specific findings about whether federal law adequately addresses the 
specific risks of bad banking behavior that the particular state banking laws 
attempt to remedy. Far from being justified by “nearly 150 years” of prece-
dent, this de facto field preemption of state banking law runs afoul of a 
deeply rooted American legal and political tradition that I term the “anti-
banker nondelegation doctrine.” 
Under this doctrine, national law would supplant state law only if the 
national lawmakers (whether Congress or agency rulemakers) actually set 
forth specific national regulatory standards to replace state law. Absent such 
specific supervision, opponents of private bankers have preferred the 
inefficiency of state law to the perceived corruption of bankers’ self-
regulation. But by broadly preempting state laws without inquiring whether 
federal law provides some substitute protections for the supplanted state 
rules, the OCC’s preemption rule in effect gives private banks autonomy 
from public oversight. This interpretation runs counter to the anti-banker 
nondelegation doctrine. 
This is not to say that the OCC’s wholesale preemption of state banking 
law is unprecedented. As I argue in Section I.B, the OCC’s preemption rule 
is best explained as a revival of McCulloch’s theory that nationally charted 
banks are “federal instrumentalities” that enjoy the same immunity from 
state taxation and regulation as genuine agencies of the federal government. 
As I explain in Part II, however, McCulloch’s federal instrumentality theory 
has long been discredited. Initially rejected by Jacksonian Democrats as an 
impermissible delegation of governmental power to private financial 
interests, the ideological underpinnings of McCulloch were further under-
mined by growing distrust of private bankers after the Panic of 1907, 
Woodrow Wilson’s New Freedom campaign, and Louis Brandeis’s campaign 
against the power of banks to regulate themselves without governmental 
oversight. Starting in the 1920s, the Supreme Court gradually loosened 
preemption doctrine to allow state laws to fill gaps in the National Bank Act 
on specific banking issues. By the end of the New Deal, McCulloch’s distinc-
tion between general state laws and specifically bank-related state laws was 
in shambles, replaced by ordinary principles of conflict preemption. 
In Part III, I argue that the OCC’s 2004 and 2011 rules are a renewed 
effort to revive McCulloch’s theory of field preemption. Under the OCC’s 
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rules, states’ general common law doctrines are given deference, while 
states’ rules specifically regulating banking practices are presumed to be 
preempted. The OCC has justified these rules as an effort to secure scale 
economies through nationally uniform regulations for banking practices that 
take place on a national scale. But by exempting state common law doctrines, 
the OCC’s rules seem far too underinclusive for this objective. Instead, the 
OCC’s rules seem better calculated to protect private banks’ autonomy from 
state regulation, even when national bank regulators have made no specific 
findings about the reliability of private banks’ self-regulation. 
This objective suffers from two flaws: First, the OCC has never articu-
lated any argument for special suspicion of states’ banking-specific rules. 
Second, section 1044(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act, defining the scope of 
banking preemption, seems to repudiate such across-the-board preemption 
of state law. Both in its language and its legislative history, section 1044(a) 
expresses the same anti-banker nondelegation principle as that pressed by 
Andrew Jackson in 1832 against Nicholas Biddle or by Louis Brandeis in 
1912 against the House of Morgan: the principle allowing state law to be set 
aside by federal regulators only after they specifically examine the risks 
controlled by state law. 
In Part IV, I conclude by outlining a strategy for finally exorcising 
McCulloch from our preemption doctrine through ordinary rules of conflict 
preemption. State law should govern banks unless the OCC has specifically 
approved the banking practice that state law forbids. There are good reasons 
to nationalize banking policy, including scale economies in risk assessment 
and suppression of state protectionism. But the traditional suspicion of 
bankers’ influence over the national government suggests that the OCC 
should approve the specific banking practices that state laws forbid only 
after making factual findings about the specific concerns addressed by the 
state laws that are preempted. This is not to say that the OCC could not 
simply ensure good banking practices by deregulating some aspects of 
banking and relying on markets untrammeled by state law. Rather, I argue 
that the adequacy of markets is a topic on which the OCC should bring its 
expertise to bear, rather than recite preemptive ipse dixit dating from 
McCulloch. 
I. THE ANTI-BANKER NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE VERSUS  
THE FEDERAL INSTRUMENTALITY DOCTRINE  
IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICAN BANKING LAW 
To understand the OCC’s rule on preemption of state law, it is helpful 
to outline the two rival nineteenth-century theories about federalism and 
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banking in a democracy. Both are deeply rooted in American anxieties about 
the relationship between democracy and finance, albeit in diametrically 
opposed ways. The “anti-banker nondelegation doctrine” is rooted in the 
fear that financiers corrupt democracy through wealth, specialized 
knowledge, and insider connections. The “federal instrumentality” theory is 
rooted in the opposite assumption: private bankers properly serve as quasi-
governmental agents whose expertise serves federal policy. Under this 
theory, private bankers need protection from shortsighted democratic 
excesses of parochial state legislation. The authoritative expositions of these 
two theories were Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. 
Maryland21 and President Andrew Jackson’s message accompanying his veto 
of the Second Bank of the United States.22 These articulations became the 
symbols of, respectively, the Federalist (and later Whig and Republican) and 
Democratic constitutional ideologies in the nineteenth century. Their 
influence lives on today: Jackson’s rhetoric animates the attacks on banking 
preemption that led to the Dodd-Frank Act, while McCulloch’s federal 
instrumentality theory gave life to the 1864 National Bank Act that, as I 
argue in Part IV, the OCC is attempting to revive with its 2004/2011 rules.23 
In assessing the latter, therefore, it is helpful to see both theories laid out in 
their pure forms. 
A. Jackson’s Veto Message and the  
Anti-Banker Nondelegation Doctrine 
President Andrew Jackson’s opposition to the Second Bank of the United 
States had deep cultural and constitutional roots. Since before the ratification 
of the Constitution, Americans in the economically peripheral Southern and 
Western regions had been deeply suspicious of banks and the Eastern 
financial elites they represented. Western Pennsylvanians’ opposition to the 
chartering of the Bank of North America in 1786 was an early manifestation 
of this suspicion,24 as was, during the ratification debates, Anti-Federalist 
 
21 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
22 Veto Message from President Jackson to the U.S. Senate (July 10, 1832) [hereinafter Jackson 
Veto Message], reprinted in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE 
PRESIDENTS 1789–1897, H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 53-210, pt. 2, at 576 ( James D. Richardson ed., 2d 
Sess. 1896). 
23 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text; infra note 274-77 and accompanying text. 
24 See generally Gordon S. Wood, Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution, 
in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL 
IDENTITY 69, 94 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987). The leader of the opponents in the state 
legislature of the proposed Bank of North America was William Findley, an Irish immigrant who 
made his home in western Pennsylvania and embodied the western Pennsylvanians’ “middling 
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opposition to granting Congress the power to charter corporations.25 The 
Anti-Federalists believed this power would benefit only speculators at 
“constant expence to the public.”26 The most obvious precedent for Jackson’s 
opposition to the Second Bank of the United States was Madison and 
Jefferson’s opposition to the First Bank of the United States.27 The opposi-
tion to the First Bank came largely from the South and West, expressed in 
constitutional terms by three leading Virginian politicians—James Madison, 
then a Congressman;28 Edmund Randolph, President Washington’s Attorney 
General;29 and Thomas Jefferson, Washington’s Secretary of State.30 Their 
 
aspirations, middling achievements, and middling resentments.” Id. at 94, 97. The opponents 
resented wealthy Philadelphia financier Robert Morris for his proposal to pool large amounts of 
capital for investment in large-scale projects like mills or factories rather than give small farmers 
access to consumer credit. Janet A. Riesman, Money, Credit, and Federalist Political Economy, in 
BEYOND CONFEDERATION, supra, at 128, 147-49. The debate over the chartering—which was 
defeated, to Morris’s dismay—is available in DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY OF PENNSYLVANIA: ON THE MEMORIALS PRAYING A REPEAL OR SUSPENSION OF 
THE LAW ANNULLING THE CHARTER OF THE BANK (Mathew Carey ed., Philadelphia, Seddon 
& Pritchard 1786). 
25 When Madison proposed an express power “to grant charters of incorporation where the 
interest of the U.S. might require & the legislative provisions of individual States may be 
incompetent,” Rufus King, the Massachusetts ally of Alexander Hamilton, argued that “[t]he 
States will be prejudiced and divided into parties by [an express power to charter corporations]” 
and reminded the Convention of the controversies over the Bank of North America by observing 
that “[i]n Philad[elphia] & New York, It will be referred to the establishment of a Bank, which has 
been a subject of contention in those Cities. In other places it will be referred to mercantile 
monopolies.” James Madison, Notes (Sept. 14, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 615-16 (Max Farrand ed., 1966). The proposal was abandoned. Id. at 616. 
26 Letter I, in A REVIEW OF THE REVENUE SYSTEM ADAPTED BY THE FIRST CONGRESS 
UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1, 12-13 (Philadelphia, T. Dobson 1794). On Anti-
Federalists’ tendencies to be “agrarian-localist” groups located further from eastern seaports and 
“commercial-cosmopolitan” occupations, see JACKSON TURNER MAIN, POLITICAL PARTIES 
BEFORE THE CONSTITUTION 358, 388 (1973) (emphases omitted). 
27 Alexander Hamilton proposed the First Bank of the United States as a private corporation 
that would enjoy the exclusive privilege of holding deposits of federal revenue without paying 
interest while using the funds as security to make loans and create a de facto federal currency 
through such commercial paper. See generally Alexander Hamilton, Second Report on the Further 
Provision Necessary for Establishing Public Credit (Report on a National Bank) (Dec. 13, 1790), in 
7 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 236 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1963). 
28 James Madison, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank (Feb. 2, 1791) (rejecting 
arguments that the Bank could be created under the “general welfare,” “necessary and proper,” or 
Taxing and Spending Clauses), in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 480, 480-90 (Jack N. Rakove 
ed., 1999). 
29 Letter from Edmund Randolph, Att’y Gen., to Pres. George Washington (Feb. 12, 1791) 
(“[L]et it be propounded as an eternal question to those who build new powers on this clause, 
whether the latitude of construction which they arrogate will not terminate in an unlimited power 
in Congress? . . . [S]o far as [the Act] incorporates the Bank, [the Attorney General] is bound to 
declare his opinion to be against its constitutionality.”), in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
ATTORNEYS GENERAL 3, 3-7 (H. Jefferson Powell ed., 1999). 
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opposition was expressed in constitutional and textual terms as a worry that 
an implied power to charter the First Bank would destroy “the essential 
characteristic of the government, as composed of limited and enumerated 
powers.”31 But underlying these legal arguments was a deeper ideological 
opposition to high finance, associated with large Northeastern cities—in the 
opposition’s bitter phrases, “speculators & Tories”32 or “stockjobbers.”33 The 
suspicion that private bankers could corruptly manipulate public officials 
was a deeply entrenched aspect of Anglo-American ideology, dating back to 
the South Sea Bubble of 1720.34 The 1720 financial scandal wracked English 
politics and inspired twelve dozen essays written by John Trenchard and 
Thomas Gordon between 1720 and 1723, collectively republished as Cato’s 
Letters.35 The broad message of Cato’s Letters was that officials were always at 
risk of being corrupted by financial elites in complex ways that voters would 
not be able to detect. More than a century after the South Sea Bubble 
popped, Andrew Jackson used its example in his opposition to the Second 
Bank: “I do not dislike your Bank any more than all banks,” Jackson informed 
 
30 See Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a 
National Bank (arguing that a bank is unconstitutional, for while it would be “convenient,” it is not 
“necessary” for the federal government (citing the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 18)), in 19 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 275, 275-80 (Julian P. Boyd & Ruth W. 
Lester eds., 1974). For a general account of the debate, see STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, 
THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788–1800, at 229-34 (1993). 
31 Madison, supra note 28, at 485. In Jefferson’s words, “To take a single step beyond the 
boundaries thus specially drawn around the powers of Congress, is to take possession of a 
boundless feild [sic] of power, no longer susceptible of any definition.” Jefferson, supra note 30, at 276. 
32 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (May 1, 1791), in 14 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON 14, 16 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983); see ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra 
note 30, at 234. 
33 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 8, 1791), in 14 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON, supra note 32, at 69, 69; see ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 30, at 244. 
34 The South Sea Company scandal was essentially a joint-stock company’s alleged bribing of 
government ministers and members of Parliament with stock in return for assistance in inflating 
the stock’s trading value. See generally HELEN J. PAUL, THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE: AN ECONOMIC 
HISTORY OF ITS ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES (2011). 
35 JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO’S LETTERS (Ronald Hamowy ed., 
Liberty Fund 1995) (1724). Cato’s Letters became one of the most widely read tracts in colonial 
America; while it was just one of the numerous works attacking the alleged corruption caused by 
private access to public credit, Cato’s Letters in particular propelled Country Party ideology across 
the Atlantic to the North American colonies. Forrest McDonald, A Founding Father’s Library, 
LITERATURE OF LIBERTY, Jan./Mar. 1978, at 4, 13; see also BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL 
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 35-36 (1967) (describing the publication of Cato’s 
Letters as a “searing indictment of eighteenth-century English politics” and its use in colonial 
America to advance “political liberty”). For another prominent example of an attack on private 
access to public credit, see Henry St. John Bolingbroke, Some Reflections on the Present State of 
the Nation, reprinted in 2 THE WORKS OF LORD BOLINGBROKE 439, 454-58 (Philadelphia, Carey 
& Hart 1841). 
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Nicholas Biddle, President of the Second Bank, “[b]ut ever since I read the 
history of the South Sea Bubble I have been afraid of Banks.”36 
In his attack on the Second Bank, Jackson transformed the idea that finan-
ciers tend to “capture” the government through insider connections and 
specialized knowledge into the platform of the Democratic Party.37 When 
vetoing the Second Bank, Jackson argued that congressional delegations of 
power, revenue, and immunities to private corporations should be subjected 
to what we would call, in modern constitutional parlance, “strict scrutiny”: 
Unless absolutely necessary, such privileges should be deemed outside 
Congress’s implied power under Article I to adopt means necessary and 
proper for the execution of express powers. According to Jackson’s veto 
message, the federal charter’s various grants of exclusive privileges to the 
Bank were improper because they were not strictly “necessary” for any 
legitimate federal policy beyond enriching the Bank’s investors.38 In partic-
ular, Jackson objected to Congress’s decision to grant the Bank exclusive 
banking privileges in Washington, D.C.,39 an exclusive role as the federal 
 
36 2 JOHN SPENCER BASSETT, THE LIFE OF ANDREW JACKSON 599 (new ed. 1931) (citation 
omitted). 
37 See SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING 
TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788–1828, at 299-301 (1999) (discussing Martin Van Buren’s use of 
Anti-Federalism’s “resonance for the vast majority of the people” in its opposition to financial 
elites as a central aspect of Jacksonian ideology); GERALD LEONARD, THE INVENTION OF PARTY 
POLITICS: FEDERALISM, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN 
JACKSONIAN ILLINOIS 112-115 (2002) (“On the Jacksonian side . . . the Bank was central, and the 
concern was constitutional.”); JOEL H. SILBEY, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL NATION, 1838–1893, 
at 81-86 (1991) (detailing how the principles of limited government embodied in Jackson’s 
“victory” over the Second Bank were eventually built into the Democratic Party’s first national 
platform). This idea of capture influenced Democrats in the state legislature, who in turn voted on 
corporate charters and banking issues in ways consistently different from—and in a much more 
hostile manner than—Whigs. See Herbert Ershkowitz & William G. Shade, Consensus or Conflict?: 
Political Behavior in the State Legislatures During the Jacksonian Era, 58 J. AM. HIST. 591, 594-621 
(1971). “Less optimistic than their Whig counterparts, and more fearful of concentrations of power, 
Democrats emphasized limited government to insure individual liberty rather than create 
opportunity”; they thus opposed granting special economic privileges. Id. at 617. Voters further 
from metropolitan centers seemed especially amenable to the Jacksonian message. See generally 
JAMES ROGER SHARP, THE JACKSONIANS VERSUS THE BANKS: POLITICS IN THE STATES 
AFTER THE PANIC OF 1837 (1970).  
38 In Jackson’s words, “[M]any of the powers and privileges conferred on [the Bank] can not 
be supposed necessary for the purpose for which it is proposed to be created, and are not, 
therefore, means necessary to attain the end in view, and consequently not justified by the 
Constitution.” Jackson Veto Message, supra note 22, at 583. 
39 Jackson’s message reserved special hostility for the provisions “declar[ing] that Congress 
shall not increase the capital of existing banks, nor create other banks with capitals exceeding in 
the whole $6,000,000” for a term of fifteen years. Id. at 584 (emphasis omitted). “The Constitution 
declares that the Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever 
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government’s fiscal agent, and a special tax exemption not enjoyed by state-
chartered banks. “It can not be ‘necessary’ or ‘proper,’” President Jackson 
complained in his veto message, “for Congress to barter away or divest 
themselves of any of the powers vested in them by the Constitution to be 
exercised for the public good. . . . This restriction on themselves and grant 
of a monopoly to the bank is therefore unconstitutional.”40 
Unlike Southern opposition to the Bank, which was largely rooted in a 
desire to prevent federal state-building rather than a desire to control 
financial elites,41 Jackson’s objection was not that Congress was exercising too 
much power over banking, but that it was not exercising enough. By delegating 
exclusive privileges for a fifteen-year period to a single private corporation, 
Congress was abdicating its responsibility to oversee self-interested private 
actors. Jackson disliked state-chartered banks as much as the Second Bank 
of the United States, but state-chartered banks were at least beyond the 
control of the “great capitalists” like Nicholas Biddle, who, Jacksonians 
believed, had special influence over federal legislators like Henry Clay and 
 
over the District of Columbia . . . and this act declares they shall not.” Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Jackson complained:  
Which is the supreme law of the land? This provision can not be “necessary” or “proper” 
or constitutional unless the absurdity be admitted that whenever it be “necessary and 
proper” in the opinion of Congress they have a right to barter away one portion of 
the powers vested in them by the Constitution as a means of executing the rest.  
Id. 
40 Id. at 583-84. 
41 On Southerners’ general desire to suppress state-building in favor of private and planta-
tion ordering, see generally ROBIN L. EINHORN, AMERICAN TAXATION, AMERICAN SLAVERY 
(2006); see also Daniel M. Mulcare, Restricted Authority: Slavery Politics, Internal Improvements, and 
the Limitation of National Administrative Capacity, 61 POL. RES. Q. 671, 677 (2008) (documenting 
the successful efforts of Southern state legislators in ensuring that the “federal government’s 
potential encroachment into states’ municipal authority . . . never made it out of the legislative 
process”). The Virginia opponents of the Second Bank were in fact financial elites themselves, 
deeply enmeshed in state banks and the “traditional system of planter elite domination” in eastern 
Virginia. WILLIAM G. SHADE, DEMOCRATIZING THE OLD DOMINION: VIRGINIA AND THE 
SECOND PARTY SYSTEM, 1824–1861, at 84 (1996). Indeed, some members of the Richmond Junto, 
the group that controlled the Republican Party in Virginia after 1800, were deeply invested in a 
system of exclusive commercial privileges: John Brockenbrough, the brother of one of Marshall’s 
opponents on the Virginia Supreme Court, was the head of the state-chartered Bank of Virginia 
and managed a network that maintained state banknotes at par and mimicked the contractionist 
policy of the Bank of the United States at the state level. See JOHN M. MCFAUL, THE POLITICS 
OF JACKSONIAN FINANCE 21 (1972); see also Joseph H. Harrison, Jr., Oligarchs and Democrats: The 
Richmond Junto, 78 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 184, 194-95 (1970). Brockenbrough and 
Thomas Ritchie, the influential editor of the Richmond Enquirer, opposed Jackson’s policy of “hard-
money” radicalism, which would have limited the power of banks to issue paper and thereby 
affected the supply of currency. LARRY SCHWEIKART, BANKING IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 
FROM THE AGE OF JACKSON TO RECONSTRUCTION 34-37 (1987). 
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Daniel Webster42: “The States in which these institutions are situated, can 
at all times control them, and would effectually interpose to prevent such 
abuses of power.”43 Democrats were familiar with the idea that democratic 
processes available through state institutions44 could legitimize enterprises 
that would otherwise exercise questionable powers.45 The problem with the 
Second Bank was that it stood outside those state democratic processes yet 
was not subject to federal supervision by the President (who controlled only 
a fifth of the directors of the Second Bank) or Congress (which, according 
to Jackson, had bargained away its right to increase the Bank’s contribution 
or grant privileges to rival institutions).  
Jacksonian opposition to the Second Bank shows that the anti-banker 
nondelegation theory was—and remains—perfectly compatible with the 
goal of imposing nationally uniform laws on banks for the sake of market 
harmonization. Protecting state power, for Jackson and his “hard money” 
followers, was a means to the end of controlling financiers, not an end in 
itself. The important thing was that the banks be democratically con-
trolled,46 not that any particular level of government control them. Jackson’s 
argument was not that Congress could not charter a national bank, but that 
Congress could not create such a bank as a self-regulating private institution, 
liberated from state law yet only minimally supervised by federal officials. 
The policies of the Jackson and Van Buren Administrations suggest that 
Democrats were not averse, in principle, to the creation of national institu-
tions that could impose centralized order on banking. For example, the “pet 
 
42 On Jacksonians’ belief in Biddle’s corruption of national politics, see STEPHEN F. KNOTT, 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE PERSISTENCE OF MYTH 31-32 (2002); and ROBERT V. 
REMINI, THE LIFE OF ANDREW JACKSON 222-23 (abr. ed. 1988). In justifying the removal of 
federal monies from the Second Bank of the United States to various state banks, future–Chief 
Justice Roger Taney, then Jackson’s Secretary of the Treasury, argued that the state banks would 
prevent the banking business from “be[ing] monopolized by the great capitalists.” 10 REG. DEB. 
app. 160 (1834) (report of Roger Taney, Secretary of the Treasury). 
43 Id. at 161; see also id. at 83-85 (Memorial of Government Directors of the Bank of the United 
States) (accusing the private directors of the Second Bank of the United States of “systematically 
nullifying the representatives of the Government and people” by behaving in a secretive manner 
and acting like a “commercial bank” rather than a public agency). 
44 Examples familiar to Democrats at the time would have included state constitutional con-
ventions, state plebiscites, small electoral districts, and numerous elections. 
45 On the strategy of legitimating banking democratically, see L. RAY GUNN, THE DECLINE 
OF AUTHORITY: PUBLIC ECONOMIC POLICY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN NEW YORK, 
1800–1860, at 186-87 (1988) (describing the treatment of banks at New York’s 1846 constitutional 
convention). 
46 See, e.g., JON MEACHAM, AMERICAN LION: ANDREW JACKSON IN THE WHITE HOUSE 
209-10 (2008) (“Jackson’s decision was framed in sweeping terms, arguing that the goal of 
government should be to better the lives of the many, not reward the few. . . . Jackson was . . . 
arguing that an end to privilege would mark the beginning of a truly democratic era.”). 
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bank” policy adopted by Levi Woodbury, Roger Taney’s successor as 
Jackson’s Secretary of the Treasury, forced the national government’s “hard 
money” agenda on private banks by conditioning eligibility to receive 
federal deposits on not issuing bank notes in small denominations.47 
Replacing “pet banks” with the “independent Treasury system,” President 
Van Buren further strengthened central control of federal revenue by 
delegating to six federal agencies the duty of holding federal revenue 
without the power either to lend it themselves or to deposit it in state-
chartered banks for private lending.48 Antebellum Democrats simply 
disliked public aid to either state- or federally chartered private banks,49 and 
they opposed Whig and Republican proposals to secure state-chartered bank 
notes with federal securities.50 But “hard money” Democrats eventually 
became the most enthusiastic supporters of U.S. Treasury Secretary Salmon 
Chase’s proposal to create “greenback” paper money as legal tender notes, 
because these notes had no connection to private banks.51 
In sum, the anti-banker nondelegation theory was not a theory of states’ 
rights but a theory of bankers’ wrongs. It was a theory of nondelegation, not 
decentralization. Arguments about the benefits of nationally uniform 
banking law are, therefore, nonresponsive to the theory’s demand for active 
democratic supervision of banking. Federal preemption of state banking 
laws is perfectly consistent with this theory as long as federal regulators 
actively supervise private bankers. Such preemption violates the anti-banker 
nondelegation theory only when it gives private bankers freedom to set 
banking policy without active democratic supervision. 
 
47 MCFAUL, supra note 41, at 77-79. 
48 The six agencies were the Treasury Department, the New Orleans Branch Mint, the Boston 
and New York customhouses, and two depositaries, one in Charleston and another in St. Louis. 
See Act of July 4, 1840, ch. 41, §§ 2–4, 5 Stat. 385, 386, repealed by Act of Aug. 13, 1841, ch. 7, 5 Stat. 
439. 
49 CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN AMERICA, 1815–1846, at 
333 (1991) (describing Postmaster General Amos Kendall’s denunciation of state-chartered banks as 
a “young Nobility System”). 
50 WILLIAM GERALD SHADE, BANKS OR NO BANKS: THE MONEY ISSUE IN WESTERN 
POLITICS, 1832–1865, at 228-29, 233-34 (1972) (noting Democratic opposition to Whig Millard 
Fillmore’s “sugges[tion of] a national free banking scheme based upon the existing state banks” 
and Democrat Salmon Chase’s opposition to using banks in eastern seaboard cities as federal 
depositories). 
51 See GRETCHEN RITTER, GOLDBUGS AND GREENBACKS: THE ANTIMONOPOLY TRADI-
TION AND THE POLITICS OF FINANCE IN AMERICA, 1865–1896, at 76 (1997) (describing “hard-
money” Jacksonians’ quick conversion to the cause of federal paper money); SHARP, supra note 37, 
at 19-21 (describing conversion of Ohio “hard-money” Democrats to the greenback movement). 
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B. McCulloch’s Federal Instrumentality Theory  
and Banking as a Suspect Classification 
McCulloch v. Maryland,52 a major target of Jackson’s veto message,53 set 
forth an entirely different model of Congress’s authority to delegate powers 
to private bankers, founded on an entirely different attitude toward bankers’ 
trustworthiness in advancing the public interest.  
In holding that the Second Bank was immune from Maryland’s tax, 
Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that the Bank was an agent of the federal 
government, despite the fact that the federal government did not actually 
control the president of this private institution who was answerable only to 
the Bank’s mostly private board of directors.54 In Marshall’s reasoning, the 
Bank counted as a de facto federal agency because it acted as the federal 
government’s exclusive fiscal agent. It was entitled to use federal revenue 
deposited in its vaults for private banking ventures such as redeeming state 
bank notes to limit the supply of paper currency. Whatever the Bank did 
within the scope of this agency was beyond the power of the states to 
control, for the same reason that the states could not control the letters held 
by a federal postmaster, the customs receipts held by a customs official, or 
the damages won by a U.S. Attorney. “Those means are not given by the 
people of a particular State,” Marshall reasoned, “but by the people of all 
the States. They are given by all, for the benefit of all—and upon theory, 
should be subjected to that government only which belongs to all.”55  
Taken literally, this theory implied that the Bank should be immune not 
only from state taxation but also from every other sort of state law—
whether contract, tort, property, or criminal law. In Marshall’s words, “[T]he 
States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or 
in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by 
Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general govern-
ment.”56 But this literal reading would make the Bank a law unto itself, as 
there was no federal code of tort, contract, crimes, or property that would 
 
52 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
53 See Jackson Veto Message, supra note 22, at 586-87; MEACHAM, supra note 46, at 211 
(“Jackson had made it clear that he interpreted the Court’s ruling in McCulloch v. Maryland . . . as 
inconclusive. But he also had made it clear that it hardly mattered—that he was bound to interpret 
the laws as he understood them regardless of what the Court said.”). 
54 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 430 (“We find . . . a total failure of this original right 
to tax the means employed by the government of the Union, for the execution of its powers.”). 
55 Id. at 428-29. 
56 Id. at 436 (emphasis added). 
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restrict its operations if state law were preempted.57 Therefore, Marshall’s 
theory of immunity enshrined in McCulloch would plainly have to be 
constrained to prevent the Bank from becoming a self-governing dictatorship. 
McCulloch offered a limiting principle to constrain the field preemption 
that it unleashed—the distinction between the banking operations of the 
Second Bank and all other aspects of the Bank. This limiting principle 
became the backbone of preemption doctrine in banking law from the end 
of the Civil War until the 1920s and is the essential principle that the OCC 
seeks to revive, so examining the distinction at its origins can clarify the 
character of the OCC’s preemption claims. 
1. McCulloch’s Distinction Between Banking-Specific  
Activities and Nonbanking Activities 
Chief Justice Marshall’s discussion in McCulloch of state taxes not 
preempted by the Bank’s charter illustrates the distinction between banking 
operations and other nonbanking activities:  
This opinion does not deprive the States of any resources which they origi-
nally possessed. It does not extend to a tax paid by the real property of the 
bank, in common with the other real property within the State, nor to a tax 
imposed on the interest which the citizens of Maryland may hold in this 
institution, in common with other property of the same description 
throughout the State. But this is a tax on the operations of the bank, and is, 
consequently, a tax on the operation of an instrument employed by the gov-
ernment of the Union . . . .58 
What do these two permissible taxes (on the bank’s real property and on 
bank stock owned by private citizens) have in common? First, they are 
 
57 Given McCulloch’s theory of immunity, state law would not apply to the Bank in federal 
court under section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 
73, 92 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006)). Section 34 provided that “the laws of the 
several states, except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall 
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the 
courts of the United States in cases where they apply.” Id. Under the McCulloch Court’s reasoning, 
the Constitution “otherwise require[d]” that state laws could not “be regarded as rules of decision.” 
Federal courts could still hear disputes involving banks under their “arising under” jurisdiction, 
see Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 826 (1824), or when fashioning 
general common law for commercial transactions, see Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 
(1842), overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). But there was no federal common 
law of crimes. The logic of McCulloch implied that the Bank should be regarded as an imperium in 
imperio, with the result that in responding to criminal fraud allegations, the Bank would not be 
governed by federal or state law, but rather only by its directors’ fiat.  
58 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436-37. 
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nondiscriminatory: they do not single out institutions affiliated with the 
federal government. Nondiscrimination, however, was not sufficient to save 
a state tax from preemption under McCulloch’s principle of supremacy—a 
point the Court made explicit ten years later in Weston v. City Council.59 
In addition, a state tax on a private institution could not control federal 
“operations.” The McCulloch Court distinguished between state burdens on 
federal operations and ordinary state laws affecting private institutions 
purely in their private capacities by invoking the concept of “resources 
which [the state governments] originally possessed.”60 Even absent the 
creation of a federally chartered bank, states would contain land and people. 
State law, therefore, did not control the operations of the Bank by asserting 
power over such land and people. When federal agencies like the Bank 
purchased real estate or sold shares of stock within a state, they took the 
private property rights to the seller’s land or the buyer’s payment as they 
found them—defined by state law. In the Weston Court’s characterization of 
the McCulloch Court’s dicta, “property acquired by that corporation in a 
state was supposed to be placed in the same condition with property acquired 
by an individual.”61 By contrast, state taxation of federal tax revenue or 
federal bond proceeds deposited in a federally chartered bank’s vaults 
tapped a source of wealth that would not exist but for the special collective 
effort of the entire Union. The latter tax was preempted because it attacked 
the Second Bank as the federal government’s fiscal agent rather than as an 
 
59 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449, 467-69 (1829). In Weston, the Court, in an opinion authored by Chief 
Justice Marshall, held that the Constitution’s principle of supremacy barred the City of Charleston 
from imposing a tax on any interest-bearing obligations, expressly including but not limited to 
certain bonds issued by the United States, id., even though, as Justice Johnson pointed out in 
dissent, the City’s tax did not discriminate against the federal government. Id. at 472-73 ( Johnson, 
J., dissentiente). According to Justice Johnson, Charleston’s exemption of “state stock, city stock, 
and stock of their own chartered banks” from the otherwise generally applicable tax was “no 
masked attack upon the powers of the general government”; rather, it could be explained by the 
city council’s desire not to impair the obligation of its own contracts or violate the immunity 
conferred on the state-chartered banks by the state legislature. Id. at 472. Indeed, the good faith of 
the city council could be inferred from its exemption of the stock of the Bank of the United States. 
Id. The express specification of six- and seven-percent bonds, according to Justice Johnson, 
although “most clumsily worded,” was simply an avoidance of “unequal and unjust” taxation of 
federal bonds bearing a lower interest rate. Id. at 472-73. The Weston majority responded that the 
tax “b[ore] directly upon” “the contract subsisting between the government and the individual,” 
because such a tax “operates upon the contract the instant it is framed, and must imply a right to 
affect that contract.” Id. at 465 (majority opinion). In other words, although the tax was paid by a 
private bondholder, it was imposed on the federal government’s act of borrowing money—it was, 
in effect, a tax on one of “the various operations of government.” Id. 
60 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436. 
61 Weston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 469. 
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ordinary holder of private property defined by state laws preexisting that 
federal charter. 
For Chief Justice Marshall, this conceptual division between a private 
institution’s nonfederal existence and its federally authorized operations 
provided a crisp way to avoid conflict:  
[W]e have an intelligible standard, applicable to every case to which the 
power may be applied. . . . We are relieved, as we ought to be, from clashing 
sovereignty; from interfering powers; from a repugnancy between a right in 
one government to pull down what there is an acknowledged right in another 
to build up; from the incompatibility of a right in one government to destroy 
what there is a right in another to preserve.62 
One does not need to be a twentieth-century legal realist, however, to 
see that Marshall’s distinction between wealth created by the Union and the 
states’ original wealth rests on a legerdemain of what Daryl Levinson has 
called constitutional “framing.”63 The boundary between federal business 
and private business could contract and expand with the judge’s willingness 
to alter the frame with which a transaction was viewed. As Professor Arthur 
Wilmarth has noted, Marshall conceded in Osborn v. Bank of the United 
States64 that the Second Bank engaged in private banking operations but 
argued that this private banking business was “inseparably connected” to its 
“public functions” of supplying currency for the federal government’s 
transactions.65 In other contexts, Marshall drew lines separating what was 
private from what was federal. Marshall conceded in Weston, for instance, 
that all of the land of those states formed after the ratification of the 
Constitution was once owned by the federal government.66 Why, then, were 
not all state taxes on real estate within such states an invasion of wealth 
created by the federal government? Chief Justice Marshall brushed this 
reductio ad absurdum aside by noting that the federal government does not 
continue to hold federal land after it is auctioned off to private citizens, 
 
62 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 429-30. 
63 Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 1311, 1367-71 
(2002) (arguing that formal distinctions between state and federal roles in regulation break down 
during constitutional litigation because the Court can “frame” the transaction by expanding or 
constricting its interpretive lens). 
64 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
65 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s Authority and Present a 
Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. 
L. 225, 240-42 (2004) (noting that the OCC has failed to issue an enforcement order against any 
of the eight largest national banks). 
66 See 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 459 (“It is said . . . that where lands are sold, the United States parts 
with the freehold with no prospect of resumption . . . .”). 
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whereas the federal government does maintain long-term relationships with 
federal bondholders until the bonds mature.67  
But this response seems like a non sequitur: Why can the federal gov-
ernment not take credit for creating the states that entered the Union after 
ratification? Such states, after all, had no original resources until they were 
created by federal statute. The Taney Court’s later effort to distinguish 
between private persons’ federally created wealth and their nonfederal 
wealth in Dobbins v. Commissioners illustrates the futility of the distinction.68 
In Dobbins, the Court held that the income of a captain of a U.S. revenue 
cutter was exempt from a county tax imposed on “all offices and posts of 
profit.”69 But, as counsel for Erie County noted, the tax on Captain Dobbins’s 
income could be viewed as a tax on one of Erie County’s private citizens.70 
The federal government did not create Captain Dobbins, after all. Even if 
the federal government created his ship, why was his labor not part of those 
“resources which [the states] originally possessed” under McCulloch? The 
Dobbins Court reasoned that Congress appropriated the money that paid 
Dobbins’s salary and that taxing that salary would vary the compensation of 
federal officers, thereby affecting the operation of a federal statute.71 In the 
Court’s words, “[T]he officer, as such, [is no] less a means to carry into 
effect these great objects than the vessel which he commands, the instruments 
which are used to navigate her, or than the guns put on board to enforce 
obedience to the law.”72 If “[t]hese inanimate objects . . . cannot be taxed by 
a state, because they are means,” then the officer could likewise not be 
taxed.73 Such reasoning invited later formalistic distinctions between salaries 
that were directly defined by law and federal employees’ incomes that were 
not so specifically defined by Congress.74 
 
67 Id. at 468-69 (“The distinction is, we think, apparent. When lands are sold, no connexion 
remains between the purchaser and the government. The lands purchased become a part of the 
mass of property in the country with no implied exemption from common burthens.”). 
68 See 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842), overruled in part by North Dakota v. United States, 495 
U.S. 423 (1990). 
69 Id. at 445-50. 
70 Id. at 443.  
71 Id. at 449-50. 
72 Id. at 448. 
73 Id. 
74 In Melcher v. City of Boston, 50 Mass. (9 Met.) 73 (1845), for instance, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court held that Boston could tax the income of a federal postal clerk by 
distinguishing Dobbins on the thin ground that the “office” of a revenue cutter captain was created 
by statute, whereas “the act regulating the post office department, does not, in terms, create any 
such office, or give any such character to these agents, as entitles them to be denominated public 
officers of the national government.” Id. at 76-77. 
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Prior to the Civil War, the McCulloch Court’s distinction between fed-
erally authorized banking operations and ordinary corporate property 
turned out to be not only conceptually limp but also politically untenable. 
South Carolina blatantly ignored the spirit of McCulloch’s two-part test at 
its creation75 and again construed the decision into desuetude in 1832 at the 
height of the nullification crisis.76  
The problem with McCulloch was not, however, merely sectional. It was 
also ideological. By preempting state taxes even when those taxes did not 
discriminate against federal property, the doctrine seemed to confer special 
privileges on private parties with connections to the federal government. As 
Justice Thompson—not a Southerner but a New Yorker—inveighed, McCul-
loch’s immunity doctrine made federal bondholders “a privileged class of 
public creditors, who, though living under the protection of the govern-
ment, are exempted from bearing any of its burthens.”77 As President 
Jackson noted in his veto message, exempting a nationally chartered bank 
from taxes that state-chartered banks had to pay conferred an unfair com-
petitive advantage on one private party over another.78 As one state court 
judge characterized the opposition to the Second Bank’s special federal privi-
leges in the eyes of its opponents, “[T]his is a great monied monopoly, which, 
in the hands of the General Government, will become a gulph in the vortex 
of which, every minor institution will be swallowed up.”79 Unsurprisingly, 
 
75 Bulow v. City Council, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) 527 (1819). The Bulow court overlooked 
the blatantly discriminatory character of a city tax on the Second Bank’s stock, apparently by 
finding its facial neutrality sufficient. As for taxing the resources of the federal government, it was 
easy enough for the court to note that the tax applied only to shares owned by private citizens and 
not the federal government. Id. at 529-30. The dissent from Justice Abraham Nott, a former 
Federalist representative to the Sixth Congress who was thrown out of office when Jefferson was 
elected in 1800, suggested the partisan character of the decision. See id. at 533-35 (Nott, J., 
dissenting) (“If Congress has the power, it can be limited in the exercise of it only by its own 
discretion. . . . It is in vain, that Congress has power to erect public institutions if they must be 
subject to the capricious will of every corporate town in the United States for their existence.”). 
76 See State ex rel. Berney v. Tax Collector, 18 S.C.L. (2 Bail.) 654, 678-79 (1831) (upholding a 
state tax on stock dividends arising from the Second Bank of the United States because the tax was 
imposed in general terms). 
77 Weston v. City Council, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449, 478 (1829). Justice Johnson used similar 
terms in decrying the Bank’s immunity as a cloak for wealthy coupon clippers: “[W]hy should one 
who enjoys all the advantages of a society purchased at a heavy expense, and lives in affluence 
upon an income derived exclusively from interest on government stock, be exempted from 
taxation?” Id. at 473. 
78 See Jackson Veto Message, supra note 22, at 587-89.  
79 Bulow, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) at 534-35 (Nott, J., dissenting). 
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the Taney Court did not cite McCulloch until the Civil War,80 after which it 
upheld federally issued “greenback” currency.81 
2. The National Bank Act of 1864 and the Judicial  
Exhumation of McCulloch 
While McCulloch’s distinction between banking-specific and all other 
state laws may have been conceptually indeterminate and arguably in-
egalitarian, the distinction was politically congenial to the new Republican-
dominated Congress and Court after the Civil War. The National Bank Act 
of 1864 expressly adopted McCulloch’s dicta on permissible taxes by banning 
taxes on national banks’ deposits but authorizing taxes on the value of 
private shareholders’ stock and banks’ real property, so long as these taxes 
were imposed in a nondiscriminatory fashion.82 As with the antebellum 
distinction in Dobbins, the conceptual foundation for this distinction seemed 
shaky. For instance, in Van Allen v. Assessors, the Court upheld a state tax on 
private shareholders’ stock on the theory that such a tax was no different 
than any other tax on personal property.83 Chief Justice Chase noted in 
partial dissent that such a tax constituted “an actual, though indirect, tax-
ation of” the federal bonds in the banks’ vaults;84 the banking associations 
in question, “resembl[ing]” the Bank of the United States, were “entitled to 
all the protection and all the immunities to which that bank was entitled.”85 
Although Chase denounced what he took to be the majority’s departure 
from McCulloch and Osborn,86 the majority was faithful to the central 
formalism of McCulloch in distinguishing between prohibited state taxes on 
banking operations (such as bank deposits) and permitted state taxes on 
activities falling within the states’ original powers (such as the owning of 
real estate or corporate shares).  
Why rely on such a practically meaningless distinction? Like the McCul-
loch Court, the postwar Congress and Supreme Court were trying to divide 
 
80 See GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE CONSTITUTION 70-73 (2007) 
(describing the antebellum demise of McCulloch). 
81 See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 537-47 (1871). 
82 National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, § 41, 13 Stat. 99, 111-12 (current version at scattered 
sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
83 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 573, 584 (1866) (“This is a distinct independent interest or property, held 
by the shareholder like any other property that may belong to him.”). 
84 Id. at 589 (Chase, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
85 Id. at 590. 
86 See id. at 591 (referring to McCulloch and Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 
Wheat.) 738 (1824), as “the judgments of great men and great judges” that “have acquired almost 
the force of constitutional sanctions”). 
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resources between the states and the federal government by those resources’ 
proximity to the business of banking. Taxes on real estate or private citizens’ 
“moneyed capital”87 were taxes on the resources ordinarily available to 
states. Taxes on deposits, by contrast, taxed a banking activity specifically 
authorized by a federal charter and were therefore an attack on federal 
resources. That the two sorts of taxes had identical practical effects did not 
detract from the value of the distinction as an apparently simple way of 
dividing taxing power between state and federal spheres. On this theory, 
good (formalistic) fences made good neighbors. 
In particular, the McCulloch dividing line was intended to perform the 
same function after the Civil War that it performed under the antebellum 
Court—to assuage state fears that federally conferred immunity would eat 
up state jurisdiction. As the Court reassuringly emphasized, nationally 
chartered banks were “governed in their daily course of business far more by 
the laws of the State than of the nation” and “[i]t is only when the State law 
incapacitates the banks from discharging their duties to the government that 
it becomes unconstitutional.”88 Even when a state tax imposed administrative 
duties identical to those imposed by the National Bank Act, the Court 
would tolerate the state law if the tax did not touch the banks’ deposits but 
instead was legally incident on types of property not unique to banking.89 
Using McCulloch to define banks’ tax liabilities under state law was a 
familiar enterprise. But how would McCulloch apply to state regulation of 
nationally chartered banks? The Supreme Court relied on a distinction 
analogous to the line between nonbanking property (e.g., real estate and 
private stock shares) and bank deposits. State laws that specifically targeted 
banking practices like the charging of interest or the taking of deposits were 
subjected to a strict rule of field preemption: if any provision of federal law 
remotely addressed the topic covered by state law, then the latter was 
preempted. In Farmers’ & Mechanics’ National Bank v. Dearing, for instance, 
the Court refused to clarify ambiguous terms in the National Banking Act 
in a manner that would subject the nationally chartered bank to state usury 
 
87 National Bank Act § 47, 13 Stat. at 111-12; Van Allen, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 577, 583-84. 
88 Nat’l Bank v. Kentucky, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 362 (1870). 
89 In Waite v. Dowley, 94 U.S. 527 (1877), in which the Court considered a state law requiring 
national banks to furnish lists of shareholders, it specifically rejected the notion that, because 
federal law also required shareholder lists, federal law “cover[ed] the same ground as that covered 
by the Vermont statute” and should, therefore, preempt Vermont law. Id. at 533-34. The Vermont 
statute served a different purpose than the similar federal law, according to the Court, and 
therefore “was not in conflict with any provision of the act of Congress.” Id. 
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penalties.90 The Court justified this result on “[t]he reasoning of Secretary 
Hamilton and of this court in McCulloch v. Maryland . . . and in Osborne 
[sic] v. The Bank of the United States.”91 Since Congress had established 
federal banks as a means to execute federal policy, the Dearing Court 
reasoned, “the States can exercise no control over them, nor in any wise 
affect their operation, except in so far as Congress may see proper to 
permit.”92 To allow states to set the penalty as well as the interest rate would 
ensure that a nationally chartered bank “would be liable, in the discharge of 
its most important trusts, to be annoyed and thwarted by the will or caprice 
of every State in the Union.”93  
The Court was equally hostile to state regulations specifically directed at 
deposit-taking when such laws were applied to nationally chartered banks. 
In Easton v. Iowa, for instance, the Court held that the National Bank Act 
preempted an Iowa law that imposed criminal liability on bank officers for 
committing fraud if they accepted deposits after knowing that their bank 
had become insolvent.94 As in Dearing, the Court invoked McCulloch and 
Osborn; it stated that, despite being private institutions, national banks were 
also federal instrumentalities that could not be subject even to state laws 
that did not directly conflict with any federal rule,95 because “confusion 
would necessarily result from control possessed and exercised by two 
independent authorities.”96 Iowa’s law could not stand, not because some 
provision of the National Bank Act specifically prohibited it or even dupli-
cated it, but rather because the Court presumed that the existing rules 
 
90 See 91 U.S. 29, 32-33 (1875). The National Bank Act incorporated as a ceiling on interest 
either “interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State or Territory where the bank is located, 
and no more,” or, “when no rate is fixed by the laws of the State or Territory, . . . a rate not 
exceeding seven per centum.” Id. at 30-31 (quoting National Bank Act § 30, 13 Stat. at 108). The 
statute’s definition of the penalty for violating this ceiling, however, suffered from an ambiguous 
modifier applying only to banks “knowingly taking, receiving, reserving, or charging a rate of 
interest greater than aforesaid.” Id. (quoting National Bank Act § 30, 108 Stat. at 108). To what did 
“aforesaid” refer—the 7% interest ceiling set by federal law, or the violation of state-defined interest 
rates as well? Under the latter interpretation, federal penalties would apply in every state; under 
the former construction, states could set their own penalties for violations of their interest ceilings.  
91 Id. at 33. 
92 Id. at 34. 
93 Id. 
94 188 U.S. 220, 227-28, 238-39 (1903). 
95 As the Easton Court acknowledged, “[T]here is no express prohibition contained in the 
Federal statutes [duplicating or contradicting Iowa’s rule], but there are apt provisions, sanctioned 
by severe penalties, which are intended to protect the depositors and other creditors of national 
banks from fraudulent banking.” Id. at 230. 
96 Id. at 232. The Court stated, “[W]e are unable to perceive that Congress intended to leave 
the field open for the States to attempt to promote the welfare and stability of national banks by 
direct legislation.” Id. at 231-32. 
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contained within the National Bank Act were exclusive: “It thus appears 
that Congress has provided a symmetrical and complete scheme for the 
banks to be organized under the provisions of the statute.”97 
Likewise, the Court held in First National Bank of San Jose v. California 
that the National Bank Act preempted California’s law providing for the 
escheat to the state of bank accounts that were unclaimed for more than 
twenty years, to the extent that the state law applied to nationally chartered 
banks.98 As with Iowa’s law in Easton, no specific provision of the National 
Bank Act addressed the abandonment of bank accounts with which Cali-
fornia’s law explicitly conflicted. Instead, the Court emphasized that the 
National Bank Act generally authorized national banks to receive deposits, a 
power that reasonably implied the right to repay the deposit on the demand 
of the rightful accountholder despite the passage of time.99 This general 
federal authorization to repay accounts did not express any specific policy 
about abandoned accounts—California was manifestly dealing with an issue 
that Congress simply had overlooked. Nevertheless, the Court presumed 
that Congress’s silence indicated an intention to exclude any state law 
specifically directed to the management of bank accounts. The basis for this 
presumption of field preemption was less a judicial inquiry into the likely 
beliefs of Congress, however, than McCulloch’s idea that national banks were 
federal instrumentalities “designed to be used to aid the government in the 
administration of an important branch of the public service.”100 Therefore, 
according to the Court, “the States can exercise no control over them, nor in 
any wise affect their operation, except in so far as Congress may see proper 
to permit.”101 The Court was not willing to infer any such permission from 
Congress’s silence on the topic of abandoned accounts.  
In sum, the Court invoked McCulloch to bar states from filling the gaps 
in the National Bank Act with state laws if those state laws specifically 
targeted activities integral to the business of banking. The aforementioned 
examples of these activities include the charging of interest (Dearing), the 
acceptance of deposits (Easton), and the maintenance of accounts (First 
National Bank of San Jose). For state laws singling out banking practices, the 
Court construed McCulloch to require a presumption of field preemption. 
Federal law was presumed to act “like an eraser that rubs out state law in a 
 
97 Id. at 231. 
98 262 U.S. 366, 366-67, 370 (1923). 
99 Id. at 368-70.  
100 Id. at 369 (quoting Farmers’ & Mechs.’ Nat’l Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29, 33 (1875)). 
101 Id. (quoting Dearing, 91 U.S. at 34). 
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given area, leaving only federal law,”102 even when nothing in the federal 
law specifically addressed the issue covered by the state law. Insofar as states 
regulated banking-specific activities (such as deposit-taking or lending money 
at interest), the National Bank Act was presumed to be “a symmetrical and 
complete scheme for the banks” that implicitly excluded any state gap-
filling on topics not covered by the Act.103 In effect, state laws specifically 
addressing banking practices fell into a “suspect classification” under which 
the Court would presume preemption absent very specific statutory author-
ization. 
But the Court completely abandoned this presumption of preemption 
when states imposed laws on nationally chartered banks that were less 
closely tied to the business of banking. As it stated in First National Bank of 
San Jose, nationally chartered banks’ “contracts and dealings are subject to 
the operation of general and undiscriminating state laws” because such laws 
“do not conflict with the letter or the general object and purposes of con-
gressional legislation.”104 Likewise, in Easton, the Court gave its blessing to 
state criminal laws by noting that “[u]ndoubtedly a State has the legitimate 
power to define and punish crimes by general laws applicable to all persons 
within its jurisdiction.”105 This proposition did not mean that such general 
state laws were never preempted by the National Bank Act. If there were 
some provision of the Act (say, its anti-preference policy regarding distribu-
tions to creditors) that contradicted a state’s common law rule, then the 
state’s rule would have to give way.106 Such a specific conflict between state 
and federal law, however, would not be presumed. Instead, the Court relied 
on an opposite presumption, absent some specific congressional intention to 
the contrary, that nationally chartered banks were “governed in their daily 
course of business far more by the laws of the State than of the nation.”107 
This tolerance of “general laws” ensured that state common laws of con-
tract, property, and corporations would generally escape preemption unless 
there was a specific conflict between a common law rule and some policy 
 
102 Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 730-31 
(2008). 
103 Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220, 231 (1903). 
104 First Nat’l Bank of San Jose, 262 U.S. at 368-69. 
105 Easton, 188 U.S. at 239. 
106 In Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U.S. 275 (1896), for instance, the Court held that 
New York could not give a preference to savings banks who were creditors of a nationally chartered 
bank in the event of the latter’s insolvency, id. at 283-84, because “one of the objects of the national 
bank system was to secure, in the event of insolvency, a just and equal distribution of the assets of 
national banks among all unsecured creditors, and to prevent such banks from creating preferences 
in contemplation of insolvency,” id. at 284.  
107 Nat’l Bank v. Kentucky, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 362 (1870). 
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contained within the National Bank Act. In McClellan v. Chipman, for 
instance, the Court allowed Massachusetts to enforce its prohibition on 
preferential transfers to creditors against a nationally chartered bank, even 
though such a rule prohibited a particular exercise of a power expressly 
conferred by the National Bank Act to receive real estate in satisfaction of 
debts.108 The Commonwealth’s prohibition of the national bank’s power to 
receive real estate in a preferential transfer was not significant and created 
“no express conflict,” because the state law barred the exercise of the national 
bank’s powers only “under particular and exceptional circumstances.”109 The 
Court reasoned that “[n]o function of such banks is destroyed or hampered 
by allowing the banks to exercise the power to take real estate, provided 
only they do so under the same conditions and restrictions to which all the 
other citizens of the State are subjected.”110 Subjecting the bank to the 
general background provisions of state contract law was not a significant 
burden on the exercise of federally conferred powers even when that law 
completely foreclosed one such exercise (receiving preferential transfers), 
because the National Bank Act presupposed that nationally chartered banks 
would engage in business, “as to their contracts in general, under the 
operation of the state law.”111  
In contrast to its decisions dealing with state laws specifically addressing 
banking practices, the Court upheld general state laws even when they 
overlapped with specific provisions of the National Bank Act. For instance, 
the private right of shareholders to inspect a nationally chartered bank’s 
books under state law, for instance, served some of the same functions as the 
powers of the Federal Comptroller of the Currency to inspect a bank’s 
accounts. In Guthrie v. Harkness, the Court nonetheless held a state law 
granting this right to private citizens not preempted112 because the Court 
was “unable to find any definition of ‘visitorial powers’”—the term used in 
the federal statute—“which can be held to include the common law right of 
the shareholder to inspect the books of the corporation.”113 
 
108 164 U.S. 347, 361 (1896). 
109 Id. at 358. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 359. 
112 199 U.S. 148, 159 (1905). The Guthrie Court acknowledged that national banks still fit 
within McCulloch’s idea of a federal instrumentality—“a public institution, notwithstanding it is 
the subject of private ownership” that “may issue bills, which circulate as part of the currency of 
the country” and that “is subject to examination and in a large measure to the supervision of the 
Comptroller of the Currency.” Id. at 157. 
113 Id. at 157. 
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What made the states’ general rules of common law less subject to 
preemption than their rules specifically addressing banking practices? The 
Court had practical reasons to want to preserve states’ common law rules. In 
1882, Congress enacted a statute eliminating nationally charted banks’ power 
(which had existed since 1863) to remove cases to federal court,114 thereby 
reducing the capacity of the federal courts to fashion general federal 
common law to govern the banks’ transactions pursuant to Swift v. Tyson.115 
Thus, the alternative to subjecting banks to state law was frequently anarchy.  
This practical explanation, however, cannot explain why the Court did 
not simply allow state law to apply in any case where the federal statute did 
not address the mischief targeted by that state law. Why not simply use 
conflict preemption to define the scope of state power over national banks 
and allow state statutes—even statutes specifically regulating deposit-taking, 
lending, or other banking-specific activities—to fill gaps in the National 
Bank Act where the latter was silent or unclear? The answer cannot be that 
general laws intrude less into the business of banking than banking-specific 
state laws. Massachusetts’s law at issue in McClellan prohibiting debtors 
from preferentially transferring real estate to banks practically impedes a 
bank’s business just as much as Iowa’s law at issue in Easton prohibiting bank 
officers from accepting deposits. The difference between the two, therefore, 
cannot be explained adequately by a desire to protect a national market with 
uniform rules suitable for interstate banking. 
The distinction between general and banking-oriented state laws was 
driven less by bankers’ needs for regulatory uniformity in a national market 
and more by judges’ needs for doctrinal simplicity. McCulloch provided a 
relatively crisp way to divide federal jurisdiction from state jurisdiction, so 
the federal courts adapted McCulloch’s state taxation rules to state regulation. 
Like state taxes on real property or corporate stock blessed by McCulloch, 
 
114 Prior to 1882, under the National Currency Act of 1863, nationally chartered banks could 
remove their contractual disputes to federal courts. National Currency Act, ch. 58, § 59, 12 Stat. 
665, 681 (1863) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1348). The 1882 Act withdrew that right of removal. 
Act of July 12, 1882, ch. 290, § 4, 22 Stat. 162, 163, repealed in relevant part by Act of June 25, 1948, 
ch. 646, § 39, 62 Stat. 869, 992-94 (1948). The 1948 Act restored the original jurisdiction of federal 
courts over suits “against any national banking association.” Sec. 1, § 1348, 62 Stat. at 933 (codified 
at 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (2006)). 
115 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Under 
Swift, federal courts had fashioned rules of general federal common law to govern nationally 
chartered banks’ transactions, corporate powers, and governance whenever disputes arising out of 
those transactions ended up in federal court. See, e.g., Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 147 (1891) 
(holding that the “degree of care required” of directors of corporations “depends upon the subject 
to which it is to be applied . . . determined in view of all circumstances”); Martin v. Webb, 110 
U.S. 7, 14-15 (1884) (recognizing the power of a cashier to bind a bank as its agent where agency 
was shown by parol evidence). 
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state common law rules seemed to fall within the states’ “original” powers 
rather than to exploit federally created resources. By contrast, state rules 
aimed at banking, like state taxes imposed on banks’ deposits, seemed to 
attack a subject (nationally chartered banking) that was purely a product of 
federal law. Treating banking-specific activity as a suspect classification that 
state laws could not address without triggering preemption was simply an 
easy way to translate McCulloch’s tax-based inquiry into the context of 
regulation. 
II. THE SECOND DEMISE OF MCCULLOCH’S  
FEDERAL INSTRUMENTALITY THEORY 
Whatever its advantages in terms of doctrinal clarity, the McCulloch 
Court’s distinction between suspect banking-specific laws and general laws 
had one striking disadvantage: it prohibited states from addressing issues that 
neither Congress nor any federal agency had ever actually considered. The 
reason was simply that the presence or absence of a federal law addressing 
some topic was orthogonal to McCulloch’s test. States could not, therefore, 
fill gaps in federal banking regulations with their own banking-specific 
rules. In practical effect, McCulloch delegated the duty of filling gaps in 
federal regulatory schemes away from states and to the officers of private 
banking corporations. Such preemption might have made sense if one 
viewed national banks’ officers as “upon much the same plane as are officers 
of the United States.”116 The success of Louis Brandeis and Woodrow 
Wilson’s attack on private bankers’ power during the presidential campaign 
of 1912, however, made this understanding of nationally chartered banks 
politically untenable. McCulloch’s theory of national banks as federal 
instrumentalities beyond the control of states’ banking-specific laws had 
been tacitly repudiated by the New Deal Court for half a century when the 
OCC attempted to revive it in 2004. 
By the early twentieth century, the notion that privately owned banks 
were the equivalent of disinterested federal officials had become completely 
indefensible. Between 1907 and 1914, the Democratic Party made opposition 
to legal privileges for private bankers the centerpiece of their political 
platform, culminating in Woodrow Wilson and Louis Brandeis’s “New 
Freedom” campaign of 1912. Like Andrew Jackson’s veto message of 1832, 
this campaign created a political climate in which McCulloch’s theory of 
 
116 First Nat’l Bank of Bay City v. Fellows ex rel. Union Trust Co., 244 U.S. 416, 430 (1917) 
(Van Devanter, J., dissenting). 
  
2013] Exorcising McCulloch 1263 
 
banking immunity from state law was politically—and, eventually, judicially—
doomed. 
A. The Panic of 1907 and Brandeis’s Revival of  
the Anti-Banker Nondelegation Principle 
The end of McCulloch’s privileging of private bankers as federal officials 
was a long time coming. Greenbackers, Anti-Monopoly Party members, and 
Populists had railed against the power of financial elites since the end of the 
Civil War,117 but these attacks had little political traction in a two-party 
system where neither party would espouse the anti-banking cause.118 
Although William Jennings Bryan made hostility to banks a major part of 
the Democratic Party’s platform in 1896, he had been so thoroughly trounced 
in the election that embrace of an anti-banking agenda seemed like political 
suicide.119 
The Panic of 1907, however, changed everything. Brought on by a co-
incidence of events—the San Francisco earthquake and the resulting loss of 
capital reserves, an unsuccessful but highly leveraged effort to corner the 
copper market, and a resulting fear that lenders in that effort would be 
illiquid—the Panic exposed the fragility of a financial system essentially 
rooted in the self-governance of decentralized bankers.120 J.P. Morgan 
almost single-handedly staved off a full-blown depression by pledging his 
own resources and strong-arming other bankers to do likewise, thereby 
guaranteeing the deposits of illiquid but solvent banks.121 Despite the 
arguably heroic quality of his intervention, Morgan’s determination of the 
 
117 See IRWIN UNGER, THE GREENBACK ERA: A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN FINANCE: 1865–1879, at 68, 68-119 (1964) (discussing the rise of the Greenback 
movement after the Civil War, which consisted of “[a]grarian intellectuals and politicians . . . who 
drew their inspiration from the anti-monopoly . . . tradition of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian 
Democracy”). 
118 The Democratic Party was the most obvious home for such anti-banking sentiment, as it 
was dominant in the undercapitalized South. The Democrats, however, depended on support from 
New York to win the Presidency, and were thus forced to adopt a more neutral attitude toward 
banking. See SCOTT C. JAMES, PRESIDENTS, PARTIES, AND THE STATE: A PARTY SYSTEM 
PERSPECTIVE ON DEMOCRATIC REGULATORY CHOICE, 1884–1936, at 44-45 (2000). 
119 On Bryan’s defeat, see generally GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, THE TRAGEDY OF WILLIAM 
JENNINGS BRYAN: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE POLITICS OF BACKLASH (2011). The 
Democratic Party’s nomination of Alton Parker in 1904 was taken to be a rejection of Bryanism 
and his “New Silver” platform. See EDMUND MORRIS, THEODORE REX 339 (2001). 
120 On the causes of the Panic of 1907, see ROBERT F. BRUNER & SEAN D. CARR, THE 
PANIC OF 1907: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE MARKET’S PERFECT STORM 13-49 (2007). 
121 See id. at 115-25 (discussing Morgan’s response to the crisis, including convening presidents of 
trust companies in his library and locking the door until a solution was reached “to pay off . . . 
depositors in time”). 
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nation’s fate by negotiating with other Wall Street elites in his private 
library rubbed against democratic sensibilities. Farmers, workers, and 
middle-class professionals all rebelled against this notion of being governed 
by the “House of Morgan.”122 
The moment was ripe for reevaluation of national banks’ privileges and 
immunities. The first sign of trouble for the idea of self-governing banks 
was the newly elected Democratic Congress’s rejection of the “Aldrich Plan” 
in 1912. A proposal of the National Monetary Commission, the Aldrich 
Plan—named for stalwart conservative Republican Senator Nelson Aldrich—
proposed a self-governing association of national banks to stave off future 
runs and panics by pooling their deposits free from meddling politicians,123 
thus effectively codifying the power that J.P. Morgan had informally 
wielded in 1907. The Democratic Congress, newly elected between 1910 and 
1912, hooted the plan down, thereby setting the stage for a showdown over 
the legal status of banks during the 1912 presidential election.124 
Like Jackson’s 1832 veto message, Woodrow Wilson’s “New Freedom” 
campaign focused on the illegitimacy of bankers’ exercising governmental 
power without democratic oversight. Inspired by Louis Brandeis’s denuncia-
tion of “the Money Trust,” the New Freedom platform asserted that invest-
ment bankers fostered inefficient and undemocratic monopolies in utilities, 
railroads, and manufacturing by sitting on “interlocking directorates” of 
corporate boards.125 The campaign was fueled by the Pujo Committee’s 1912 
investigation into the influence of bankers over industry.126 The Committee’s 
report concluded that a system of interlocking directorates allowed a 
handful of bankers to govern the nation. Louis Brandeis’s essays in Harper’s 
 
122 See RICHARD T. MCCULLEY, BANKS AND POLITICS DURING THE PROGRESSIVE ERA: 
THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, 1897–1913, at 280-81 (1992) (discussing the 
Pujo Committee’s criticism of private bankers’ control over the economy). 
123 The National Monetary Commission was an entity created by the Aldrich-Vreeland Act 
in the wake of the Panic of 1907. See ELMUS WICKER, THE GREAT DEBATE ON BANKING 
REFORM: NELSON ALDRICH AND THE ORIGINS OF THE FED ch. 4 (2005). For the Commis-
sion’s report, see NELSON W. ALDRICH ET AL., NAT’L MONETARY COMM’N, REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL MONETARY COMMISSION, S. DOC. NO. 62-243 (2d Sess. 1912). 
124 See MCCULLEY, supra note 122, at 260-62 (discussing the unified Democratic opposition 
to the Aldrich Plan). 
125 See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 
51-52 (1914) (referring to interlocking directorates as “the most potent instrument of the Money 
Trust” because of the conflicts of interest they create). 
126 See id. at 32-33 (reporting the Committee’s findings that members of J.P. Morgan & Co. 
held 341 directorships in 112 corporations with aggregate resources of $22 billion). The Pujo 
Committee proceedings included calling an aged J.P. Morgan to testify about the appointments of 
members of the “House of Morgan” and related financial firms to dozens of corporate boards. See 
RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN 152-58 (1990). 
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Weekly publicized the Pujo Committee’s findings and reinforced the idea 
that bankers formed a “financial oligarchy”127 resulting in “the suppression 
of industrial liberty, indeed of manhood itself.”128 Brandeis called for a 
variety of reforms to curb bankers’ power, including more disclosures to 
investors of bankers’ fees and influence129 and stricter prohibitions on 
bankers’ conflicts of interest when sitting on multiple boards.130 Soon 
thereafter, Congress enacted the 1913 Federal Reserve Act, which included 
the key Brandeisian principle that banks in the federal reserve system must 
be subject to the supervision of a Federal Reserve Board appointed by the 
President.131 
Beyond this supervision of banks, however, the Federal Reserve Act in-
corporated an assumption that Andrew Jackson would readily have embraced: 
private bankers could not be trusted to determine the nation’s financial 
policies without some form of democratic oversight. This anti-banker 
nondelegation doctrine implied that federal law should not preempt state 
banking rules unless federal officials had actually evaluated the particular risks 
addressed by state law. In effect, Brandeis’s assault on government by 
bankers was also an assault on McCulloch’s theory of field preemption. 
B. Judicial Retreat from McCulloch’s Field Preemption, 1924–1948 
In short, the early twentieth century saw a revival of the anti-banker 
nondelegation doctrine remarkably similar to the Jacksonian principles that 
led to the first downfall of McCulloch. By the 1920s, the Court itself had 
beaten a steady retreat from its earlier confident assertions that nationally 
chartered banks were federal instruments beyond state control. Instead, the 
Court repeatedly used ordinary principles of conflict preemption to uphold 
state laws specifically targeting banking practices where there was no 
conflict with the National Bank Act. 
There were signs of trouble for McCulloch even before the 1920s. First 
National Bank of Bay City v. Fellows ex rel. Union Trust Co. was ostensibly a 
nationalistic decision in which the Court upheld the Federal Reserve Act of 
1913 by finding that Congress had the power to authorize national banks to 
 
127 See id. ch. 1. 
128 Id. at 48. The essays, originally published between August 1913 and December 1914 in 
Harper’s Weekly, were later published as a tract. Id. at xiv. 
129 See id. at 101-08. 
130 See id. at 56 (“Obviously, interlocking directorates, and all that term implies, must be 
effectually prohibited before the freedom of American business can be regained.”).  
131 Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, §§ 9–11, 38 Stat. 251, 259-63 (1913) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
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hold securities as trustees in probate proceedings.132 The Court summarily 
dismissed the notion that delegating broad supervisory powers to the 
Federal Reserve Board violated the nondelegation doctrine. But buried in 
the decision was a sign of judicial impatience with McCulloch: the Court 
upheld the power of state courts to enforce state limits on national banks.133 
Setting aside nineteenth-century decisions prohibiting state courts from 
issuing writs of habeas corpus against federal officers, the Court upheld 
state courts’ power to supervise national banks by noting the urgent need 
for state probate courts to secure determinations of the powers of trustees.134 
As Justice Van Devanter noted in dissent, the idea of allowing state courts 
to enforce state laws against federal instrumentalities was flatly inconsistent 
with the McCulloch Court’s idea that national banks’ officers stand “upon 
much the same plane as [do] officers of the United States.”135 By 1917, 
McCulloch’s equation of private bankers with federal officials had apparently 
worn thin. 
First National Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri was the first decision over-
throwing McCulloch’s analysis to uphold a state law.136 In First National Bank 
in St. Louis, the Court upheld Missouri’s law barring banks from opening 
branch offices within the state.137 Ignoring McCulloch’s principle of field 
preemption, the Court instead applied only those precedents, like McClellan, 
that allowed state laws to be enforced where they did not conflict with any 
specific provisions of the National Bank Act. The majority began by noting 
that the National Bank Act “by fair construction of the statutes” did not 
empower nationally chartered banks to form branches unless they had such 
powers under a previous state charter.138 It was “self evident” that a state 
statute prohibiting the formation of branches could not frustrate the 
purpose of a federal statute that did not authorize branches.139 Given that 
the state statute did not conflict with the National Bank Act, the majority 
concluded that “the way is open for the enforcement of the state statute.”140 
In other words, the Court ignored, without expressly overruling, McCulloch’s 
theory of field preemption and instead applied ordinary conflict preemption. 
 
132 See 244 U.S. 416, 421-28 (1917). 
133 Id. at 426-28. 
134 Id. at 428. 
135 Id. at 430 (Van Devanter, J., dissenting); see id. (suggesting that interference with national 
banks by state legislatures “seriously imperiled” federal supremacy). 
136 First Nat’l Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 656-59 (1924). 
137 Id. at 658-61. 
138 Id. at 657-59. 
139 Id. at 659. 
140 Id. at 660. 
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In his dissent, Justice Van Devanter correctly asserted that “principles . . . 
settled a century ago in the days of the Bank of the United States” dictated 
that Missouri’s banking-specific statute should be preempted insofar as it 
applied to “corporate instrumentalities of the United States.”141 
The destruction of McCulloch’s immunity for national banks was com-
pleted in the New Deal Courts of Chief Justices Hughes, Stone, and Vinson. 
From 1934 until 1948, the Court repeatedly applied ordinary conflict 
preemption, while ignoring the idea that banks should be free from state 
oversight even when federal law did not endorse banks’ policy choices, to 
uphold the application of states’ banking-specific laws to nationally char-
tered banks. In Lewis v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., the Court held that states 
could prohibit a bank from being appointed a depository of state or local 
government revenues unless the bank provided a bond creating a lien on all 
of the bank’s assets to ensure faithful performance of the contract.142 The 
Court began and ended its analysis with the question of whether the 
National Bank Act’s prohibition on preferences for creditors implicitly 
prohibited such a bonding requirement. Finding no conflict, the Court 
upheld the Georgia statute without any reference to McCulloch.143 Likewise, 
in Wichita Royalty Co. v. City National Bank of Wichita Falls, the Court 
followed Erie Railroad v. Tompkins in applying Texas’s law to the question of 
whether a bank was responsible for a depositor’s trustee’s misappropriation of 
a deposit for personal use.144 Again, there was no mention of McCulloch’s 
prohibition on subjecting national banks to states’ banking-specific laws. 
Finally, in Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, the Court virtually over-
ruled its 1923 opinion in First National Bank of San Jose when it held that 
Kentucky could deem that certain bank accounts were abandoned and, 
therefore, would escheat to the State upon notice to accountholders and 
after a defined interval of time.145 The Court attempted to distinguish First 
National Bank of San Jose by characterizing Kentucky’s statute as less “un-
usual” and “harsh” than California’s and, therefore, less of a deterrent to 
depositors’ entrusting their funds to a national bank.146 But the Court’s re-
characterization of McCulloch’s holding represented the complete repudiation 
of McCulloch’s theory of field preemption. According to the Luckett Court, 
the Kentucky statute was consistent with McCulloch, because it “does not 
 
141 Id. at 662 (Van Devanter, J., dissenting). Justice Van Devanter’s dissent was joined by 
Chief Justice William Howard Taft and Justice Pierce Butler. 
142 292 U.S. 559, 565-70 (1934). 
143 Id. 
144 306 U.S. 103, 104-10 (1939). 
145 321 U.S. 233, 241-42 (1944). 
146 Id. at 250. 
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discriminate against national banks, cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 
316, by directing payment to the state by state and national banks alike, of 
presumptively abandoned accounts.”147 Such a statement flew in the face of 
the Marshall Court’s understanding of McCulloch. As noted earlier, the 
Weston Court specifically rejected this idea that nondiscrimination against the 
federal government sufficed to satisfy McCulloch’s principle of supremacy.148 
The Luckett Court also noted that there was not “any word in the national 
banking laws which expressly or by implication conflicts with the provisions 
of the Kentucky statutes.”149 This observation, while true, was irrelevant 
under Easton and Dearing, under which such a conflict was presumed absent 
clear federal authorization for state regulation of federal instrumentalities. 
The Luckett Court, in short, adopted sub silentio a new and narrower 
reading of banks’ immunity that permitted states to impose regulations on 
lending and deposit-taking, so long as the states did not thereby discriminate 
against any nationally chartered banks or contradict any policies of the 
federal government. This implicitly narrower reading did not mean that 
banks never received the benefits of preemption. If a federal statute con-
tained a specific provision preempting a state law, then, of course, that state 
law could have no effect.150 Moreover, the preemptive provision of the 
federal statute could be implicit rather than explicit; if some state law 
contradicted the spirit or purpose of federal banking law, it would be set 
aside.151 Federal courts could exercise a lot of creativity in inferring such 
implied federal purposes from federal statutes because, during the 1940s, 
the New Deal Court embraced a robust judicial purposivism in statutory 
interpretation.152 This purposivism could be the occasion of much judicial 
hand wringing about the degree to which federal banking law permitted 
judges to invent principles of federal common law to govern national 
banks.153 
 
147 Id. at 247. This was the Court’s only citation to McCulloch. 
148 Cf. supra subsection I.B.1. 
149 Anderson Nat’l Bank, 321 U.S. at 247-48. 
150 See, e.g., Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 99-101 (1941) 
(holding that the tax exemption for federal land banks expressly conferred by the Federal Farm 
Loan Act of 1916 applied to and therefore preempted North Dakota’s attempt to enforce a sales tax 
on a bank’s purchase of lumber). 
151 See, e.g., Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 200-01 (1940) (holding that federal courts 
could disregard a state law that would circumvent a federal prohibition on a national bank’s 
purchasing its own stock). 
152 See, e.g., United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940) (“In the interpre-
tation of statutes, the function of the courts is easily stated. It is to construe the language so as to 
give effect to the intent of Congress.”). 
153 Compare D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 456-61 (1942) (defending a 
principle of federal common law, inferred from the spirit of the statute, that certain state law 
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C. Replacing McCulloch with Modern Conflict Preemption 
After Luckett, the fundamental principle defining banking preemption 
had changed, as lower courts recognized.154 The Supreme Court no longer 
asserted that states could never regulate national banks. The Court instead 
emphasized that states could not deny or impair banking powers that 
Congress had explicitly conferred. 
Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson155 illustrates this post–New Deal 
focus on conflict preemption. The Florida law at issue in Barnett—a pro-
hibition on the sale of insurance by any bank affiliated with a holding 
company156—was a banking-specific law that, under the old Dearing-Easton 
reading of the National Bank Act, should have been automatically preempted 
as a forbidden regulation of national banks’ deposit-taking operations. The 
Barnett Court, however, ignored the banking-specific character of the Florida 
law. Instead, it focused on the conflict between the Florida statute and a 
1916 federal law authorizing national banks to sell insurance.157 Relying on 
what it called “ordinary legal principles of pre-emption,”158 the Barnett 
Court stated that a federal grant of banking power “ordinarily pre-empt[s] 
 
defenses against a promissory note were inapplicable against the FDIC as the receiver of a 
national bank), with id. at 465 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (urging reliance on state law because 
“we have put to one side, as unnecessary to the disposition of this case, the duty of this Court to 
make law ‘interstitially’ (as Mr. Justice Holmes put it in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 
221 [(1917)]) in controversies arising in the federal courts outside their diversity jurisdiction”). 
Frankfurter’s skepticism about federal common law is indicated by his citation of the particular 
passage of Holmes’s dissenting opinion in Jensen in which Holmes declared that he “recognize[d] 
without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they are 
confined from molar to molecular motions.” Jensen, 244 U.S. at 221 (Holmes, J., dissenting). He 
concluded that a federal court cannot make up admiralty law wholesale but rather “must take the 
rights of the parties from a different authority, just as it does when it enforces a lien created by a 
State.” Id. Holmes urged reliance on state law because “[t]he only authority available is the 
common law or statutes of a State.” Id. 
154 See, e.g., California v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 319 (S.D. Cal. 1951) 
(distinguishing Luckett because it addressed the powers of nationally chartered banks rather than 
nationally chartered savings and loans, and noting that for banks, Congress left “open a field for 
state regulation and the application of state laws; but as to federal savings and loan associations, 
Congress made plenary, preemptive delegation to the [Home Loan Bank] Board to organize, 
incorporate, supervise and regulate, leaving no field for state supervision”). Although Coast Federal 
is merely a district court decision, it was one of the first decisions to recognize that federally 
chartered savings and loans were governed by a more aggressive standard of federal preemption 
than nationally chartered banks—a distinction the district court correctly attributed to New Deal 
decisions like Luckett. For a discussion of the standard applying to savings and loans, see infra 
notes 289-300 and accompanying text. 
155 517 U.S. 25 (1996). 
156 Id. at 28-29. 
157 See id. at 31-38. 
158 Id. at 37-38. 
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contrary state law” because “normally Congress would not want States to 
forbid, or to impair significantly, the exercise of a power that Congress 
explicitly granted.”159 Because the Florida law barred Barnett Bank from an 
exercise of a federally conferred power, the Court held that it constituted a 
“significant[]” impairment of that power160—hardly a surprising conclusion, 
given the breadth of the state law’s restriction. In so holding, the Barnett 
Court cited Luckett for the proposition that Barnett’s holding would not 
“deprive States of the power to regulate national banks, where (unlike here) 
doing so does not prevent or significantly interfere with the national bank’s 
exercise of its powers.”161 The citation was a significant affirmation of 
Luckett’s principle that federal banking law does not automatically preempt a 
state regulation that is targeted specifically at a banking activity.162 
It would be an exaggeration to state that the Court abandoned entirely 
the earlier nineteenth-century tradition under which states were barred 
from regulating banks with laws specifically targeting banking activities. 
The old precedents continued to be cited. In Watters v. Wachovia Bank, for 
instance, the Court approvingly quoted Dearing’s sweeping statement that 
“the States can exercise no control over [national banks], nor in any wise 
affect their operation, except in so far as Congress may see proper to 
permit.”163 The Watters Court acknowledged that “[f]ederally chartered 
banks are subject to state laws of general application in their daily business to 
the extent such laws do not conflict with the letter or the general purposes 
of the [National Banking Act].”164 However, the use of the phrase “state 
laws of general application” suggested by negative implication that state 
laws not of general application would be preempted. This suggestion of 
some sort of field preemption for all state laws targeting national banks’ 
lending or deposit-taking activities was reinforced by the Watters Court’s 
subsequent observation that “[d]iverse and duplicative superintendence of 
national banks’ engagement in the business of banking, we observed over a 
century ago, is precisely what the [National Bank Act] was designed to 
prevent.”165 To support this last assertion, the Court quoted with approval 
the Easton Court’s statement that federal banking law created a banking 
 
159 Id. at 32-33. 
160 Id. at 33. 
161 Id. 
162 In the case of Luckett, the banking activity at issue was the maintenance of abandoned or 
dormant accounts. See supra text accompanying notes 145-48. 
163 Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 550 U.S. 1, 11 (2007) (alterations in original) (quoting Farmers’ 
& Mechs.’ Nat’l Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29, 34 (1875)). 
164 Id. (emphasis added). 
165 Id. at 13-14.  
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system that was “independent, so far as powers conferred are concerned, of 
state legislation which, if permitted to be applicable, might impose limita-
tions and restrictions as various and as numerous as the States.”166  
The Watters Court, however, never embraced wholesale field preemption 
of all state laws that specifically targeted banking business. The Court 
rested its holding on a specific authorization rather than a general ban on 
states’ enforcing banking-specific rules against national banks or their 
subsidiaries. In analyzing why Michigan could not subject such subsidiaries 
to the general oversight of Michigan’s banking authorities, the Watters Court 
relied on the National Bank Act’s specific provision barring states from 
exercising visitorial powers over national banks.167 Moreover, the Court 
offered an argument specific to the “duplicative” character of the general 
supervisory power asserted by Michigan: the OCC already exercised 
precisely the same power in the form of its visitorial power.168 
The Court most clearly rejected McCulloch’s theory of preemption in 
Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n.169 There, the Court, in an opinion by Justice 
Scalia, held that the OCC’s exclusive visitorial power did not preempt the 
New York Attorney General’s power to enforce the state’s fair-lending laws 
in state or federal court.170 In defense of its theory that the lawsuit was 
preempted because it was an exercise of visitorial powers exclusively vested 
in the OCC, the OCC argued that the National Bank Act barred, at the 
very least, public officials’ lawsuits to enforce “state banking laws.”171 These 
specific banking laws, the OCC argued, were preempted even if enforce-
ment of other more general laws was not preempted—for instance, general 
rules of contract and property—that supply “the legal infrastructure” for 
banking.172 In rejecting this “distinction between ‘implementation’ of 
‘infrastructure’ and judicial enforcement of other laws,” Justice Scalia 
observed that “[o]f course [this distinction] can be found nowhere within 
the text of the statute” and, therefore, “attempts to do what Congress 
declined to do: exempt national banks from all state banking laws, or at least 
state enforcement of those laws.”173 Thus, the Clearing House Court expressly 
 
166 Id. at 14 (quoting Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220, 229 (1903)). 
167 See id. at 14-15 (“No national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as author-
ized by Federal law . . . .” (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2006))). 
168 Id. at 13-14. 
169 557 U.S. 519 (2009). 
170 Id. at 535-36. 
171 Id. at 529-33. 
172 Id. at 531-32 (quoting Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1895, 1896 (Jan. 13, 
2004)). 
173 Id. at 533. It is perhaps not surprising that Clearing House was written by the Court’s most 
outspoken textualist. 
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rejected the idea that the National Bank Act contained an implicit general 
prohibition on state laws specifically tailored for the regulation of lending—
precisely the position that the Court had defended since McCulloch.174 
Indeed, even the OCC seemed to concede that the state’s fair-lending law 
might not be preempted “because its substantive requirements are not 
meaningfully different from those imposed by federal law.”175  
In sum, since the New Deal, the Court has gradually edged away from 
the idea, derived from McCulloch, that national banks are immune from 
state laws specifically targeting the business of banking. The New Deal 
Court never explained why it retreated from McCulloch’s holding that 
nationally chartered banks were immune from state regulation of their 
banking activities. One can, however, identify two trends in the policies and 
jurisprudence of the early twentieth century sufficient to explain the out-
comes of these decisions: decreasing trust of private bankers and increasing 
trust for state governments. 
First, the idea that federally chartered banks were somehow carrying out 
the policies of the federal government simply seemed absurd in light of the 
distrust of bankers expressed in the progressive and populist politics leading 
up to the Wilson Administration. The Second Bank of the United States 
might plausibly have been regarded as a federal agent akin to, say, a member 
of the Federal Reserve today. The federal government owned twenty 
percent of the Bank’s stock and appointed several of its directors, and the 
Bank enjoyed the unique position of holding and disbursing federal deposits 
in return for a sizable “bonus” paid over to the federal government.176 One 
might, therefore, regard the Bank as a sort of quasi-governmental entity like 
Amtrak—an entity that, while formally private, nevertheless enjoyed a unique 
status as an agent of federal financial policy.177 Nationally chartered banks, 
however, do not have a relationship with the federal government remotely 
resembling that which the Second Bank had. The federal government does 
 
174 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act’s Expansion of State Authority to Protect 
Consumers of Financial Services, 36 J. CORP. L. 893, 936-37 (2011) (explaining the Clearing House 
Court’s rejection of “‘legal infrastructure’ theory”). 
175 Brief for the Federal Respondent at 42, Clearing House, 557 U.S. 519 (No. 08-453), 2009 
WL 815241. 
176 For more on the structure of the Second Bank as a governmental agency, see RALPH C.H. 
CATTERALL, THE SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 453-77 (1903). The Bank, by the 
terms of its charter, was obliged to pay a “bonus” of $1,500,000 to the United States. Id. at 453, 474. 
177 See Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995) (“[W]here, as [in the 
case of Amtrak], the Government creates a corporation by special law, for the furtherance of 
governmental objectives, and retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the 
directors of that corporation, the corporation is part of the Government for purposes of the First 
Amendment.”). 
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not appoint their directors, own their stock, or even review their federal 
charters according to any predictable standards.178 That such banks make 
various marketing, lending, or deposit-taking decisions hardly means that 
the federal government has implicitly endorsed those decisions. To the 
contrary, as Louis Brandeis urged before his appointment to the Supreme 
Court, those decisions might be made by an “inner group of the Money 
Trust”179—“builders of imperial power”180 or a “financial oligarchy”181—
without any imprimatur whatsoever from any democratically accountable 
federal official. 
Indeed, the legal tradition of private implementation of public policy on 
which McCulloch rested has been torn down by late nineteenth-century 
state-building. It was the norm in the early nineteenth century to delegate 
regulatory matters to essentially private actors operating for their own 
profit. Navy ship captains were paid through prize money from their 
captures, U.S. Attorneys were paid with bounties from their victorious 
lawsuits, and so forth.182 This regime of privatized government, however, 
was washed away by the gradual development of a professional, full-time 
American bureaucracy between the end of the Civil War and the New Deal. 
Delegations of governmental power to private enterprises further declined 
with the nondelegation decisions, such as A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States, in which the Court struck down the National Industrial 
Recovery Act’s authorization for private trade associations of industry to fix 
prices, wages, and working conditions in codes of fair competition.183 This 
doctrinal rejection of private delegations not closely supervised by full-time 
bureaucrats is a special application of the more general idea that private 
entities cannot have the last word on their own regulation. This principle is 
so deeply rooted in American political culture that efforts to immunize 
 
178 Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 
73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 685 (1988) (explaining that the process of obtaining a national bank 
charter is untethered by any predictable standards). 
179 BRANDEIS, supra note 125, at 35. 
180 Id. at 36. 
181 Id. ch. 1. 
182 See NICHOLAS PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION 
IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940 (forthcoming Oct. 2013). On the role of private profit in 
the compensation of the Navy, see Nicholas Parrillo, The De-Privatization of American Warfare: 
How the U.S. Government Used, Regulated, and Ultimately Abandoned Privateering in the Nineteenth 
Century, 19 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2007). 
183 See 295 U.S. 495, 503 (1935) (finding that section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery 
Act “demonstrates an illegal delegation of legislative power”); see also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 
298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (striking down the delegation of power to the majority of miners to set 
wages for an entire industry and calling it “legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form”). 
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federally chartered banks from state control through broad field preemption 
have twice collapsed. 
Second, and quite apart from hostility toward bankers, the foundations 
of McCulloch were being sapped by increased judicial trust of states. Chief 
Justice Marshall called for a simple, formal, bright line separating federal 
and state jurisdiction because he wanted the Court to be 
relieved, as [it] ought to be, from clashing sovereignty; from interfering 
powers; from a repugnancy between a right in one government to pull down 
what there is an acknowledged right in another to build up; from the in-
compatibility of a right in one government to destroy what there is a right 
in another to preserve.184  
Marshall’s implicit assumption—accurate in the antebellum period—was 
that states were itching to undermine federal policy and, therefore, needed 
to be restrained by clear lines rather than by any “perplexing inquiry” into 
degrees of interference with federal ends.185 
By the 1920s, however, this concern with states making war on the federal 
government was obsolete, and its obsolescence led the Court to abandon 
antebellum notions of federal immunity from state taxes. Justice Holmes 
led the way in 1928 with his famous aphorism that “[t]he power to tax is not 
the power to destroy while this Court sits.”186 Although Holmes made this 
remark in dissent from an opinion barring state taxation of gasoline sold to 
the federal government by a private firm,187 his view became the law within 
a decade. Rather than stop states’ usurpations with simple, bright-line rules 
that would have overprotected federal turf, the Court switched to case-by-
case adjudication of mushy standards, weighing each state law against the 
specific federal interest that it was said to transgress. In Graves v. New York 
ex rel. O’Keefe, the Court finally overruled Dobbins and allowed states to tax 
the incomes of federal employees.188 In approving what he took to be the 
majority’s “important shift in constitutional doctrine,”189 Justice Frankfurter 
noted that the expansive scope of federal immunity from state taxes was the 
 
184 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 430 (1819). 
185 Id. 
186 Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
187 See id. at 220-22. 
188 See 306 U.S. 466, 487 (1939) (holding that an immunity of federal employees from state 
taxation should not be found “to be implied from the Constitution, because if allowed it would 
impose to an inadmissible extent a restriction on the taxing power which the Constitution has 
reserved to the state governments”). 
189 Id. at 487 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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result of “an unfortunate remark in the opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland” 
that was made “[p]artly as a flourish of rhetoric and partly because the 
intellectual fashion of the times indulged a free use of absolutes.”190 But this 
penchant for “absolutes” was driven not only by “intellectual fashion” but 
also by antebellum political realities—in particular, states’ seeking to shut 
down federal policies and even make war against the federal government—
that had since vanished.  
The obsolescence of extreme distrust toward state governments similarly 
justified the Court’s shift away from field preemption of state laws regulating 
federally chartered banks’ banking activities. As the Supreme Court noted 
in Atherton v. FDIC, the notion that federally chartered banks required the 
protection of federal common law “might have seemed a strong one during 
most of the first century of our Nation’s history, for then state-chartered 
banks were the norm and federally chartered banks an exception—and 
federal banks often encountered hostility and deleterious state laws.”191 That 
fear of state hostility to federal policy being obsolete, the capacious im-
munity designed to counteract it also lapsed into desuetude. The Atherton 
Court concluded that “[t]o point to a federal charter by itself shows no 
conflict, threat, or need for ‘federal common law.’”192 For identical reasons, 
the mere existence of a federal charter also indicates no special need for 
field preemption whenever the powers associated with that charter are 
limited. 
III. MCCULLOCH’S THIRD RESURRECTION? THE CASE AGAINST  
THE OCC’S 2004 AND 2011 RULES ON PREEMPTION 
One might think that McCulloch’s theory of field preemption, having 
died two deaths already—first at the hands of Andrew Jackson in 1832 and 
then at those of Louis Brandeis in 1912—would be well and truly buried. In 
2004, however, the OCC revived the theory once more. Provoked, in part, 
by states’ efforts to control so-called predatory lending,193 the OCC issued 
rules in 2004 that broadly construed the preemptive effects of federal 
banking laws. Relying on its visitorial powers under the National Bank 
 
190 Id. at 489. 
191 519 U.S. 213, 221 (1997). 
192 Id. at 223. 
193 Predatory loans are loans with high fees or interest rates made to borrowers at high risk of 
defaulting. See Nicholas Bagley, Note, The Unwarranted Regulatory Preemption of Predatory Lending 
Laws, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2274, 2277-78 (2004) (reviewing “predatory lending” practices and state 
responses thereto during the late 1990s and early 2000s). 
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Act,194 the OCC took an outspoken stance against any state enforcement of 
banking-specific laws on lending or deposit-taking.195 The OCC also 
aggressively asserted that nationally chartered banks were free to disregard 
state laws specifically related to lending money secured by real estate, on the 
theory that such state laws “obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank’s 
ability to fully exercise its Federally authorized real estate lending powers.”196 
The OCC emphasized that its list of preempted state limits was non-
exhaustive and that other state laws could be preempted if the OCC found 
that they obstructed, impaired, or conditioned banks’ power to make loans 
secured by real estate.197 The OCC qualified this sweeping criterion for 
preemption by listing several categories of laws, such as contracts, torts, 
criminal law, rights to acquire and transfer real property, and rights to 
collect debts, that were presumptively not preempted “to the extent that 
they only incidentally affect the exercise of national banks’ real estate 
lending powers.”198 
In essence, the 2004 rules reinstated the nineteenth-century theory, 
derived from McCulloch, that banking-specific laws constitute a suspect 
classification for purposes of preemption under the National Bank Act.199 
As with McCulloch’s two earlier incarnations, an economic crisis inspired a 
political backlash, this time against the OCC’s 2004 attempt to insulate 
banks from state law. Following the collapse of real estate prices between 
2007 and 2008 and the resulting wave of bank failures and bailouts, Congress 
enacted the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, and in it, section 1044(a), a provision 
containing specific language apparently constraining the preemption of 
states’ “consumer financial laws.”200 
 
194 See 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2006) (“No national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers 
except as authorized by Federal law . . . .”).  
195 “Federal law commits the supervision of national banks’ Federally-authorized banking 
business exclusively to the OCC, (except where Federal law provides otherwise), and does not 
apportion that responsibility among the OCC and the states.” Bank Activities and Operations, 69 
Fed. Reg. 1895, 1895 (Jan. 13, 2004). 
196 Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 
1911 ( Jan. 13, 2004) (quoting the text of the revised rule later codified at 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a) (2005) 
(current version at 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a) (2012))). For an example of the types of preempted state 
laws, see, 12 C.F.R. § 7.4007(b) (2012) (deposit-taking); id. § 7.4008(d) (non–real estate loans); id. 
§ 34.4(a) (real estate loans). 
197 Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1911. 
198 Id. at 1917 (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 34(b) (2005)). 
199 See supra subsection I.B.1. 
200 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 1044(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2014-17 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b (2006, Supp. IV 2011)). 
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In 2011, however, the OCC doubled down on its 2004 approach to 
preemption by reissuing its 2004 rules in barely altered form.201 As in 1832 
and 1912, the stage is once more set for a legal and political showdown over 
federal officials’ efforts to protect national banks from state control. As I 
argue below, there are several plausible legal arguments that the OCC 
should lose this third round. 
First, as a matter of pure administrative rationality, the OCC’s 2004 and 
2011 preemption rules are only tenuously related to the goal of market 
harmonization that the OCC proffers as its justification. The rules are more 
closely geared toward protecting private bankers’ autonomy than national 
regulatory uniformity. This mismatch suggests that those rules could be 
struck down as arbitrary and capricious under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) of the 
Administrative Procedure Act. 
Second, section 1044(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act seems to adopt an anti-
banker nondelegation doctrine that rejects the idea of preempting state law 
without substituting equivalent federal regulation. In particular, section 
1044(a)’s specific call for “case-by-case” evaluation of “the impact of a 
particular State consumer financial law on any national bank”202 is hard to 
explain unless it requires that, before national regulators preempt a state 
law, they analyze the specific risks addressed by that law to ensure that 
bankers can be trusted to self-regulate those risks. Despite its assurances to 
the contrary, the OCC has no such procedure in place for such analysis. 
A. Are the OCC’s Preemption Rules Rationally Related  
to the Goal of Market Harmonization? 
What explains the OCC’s division of state laws into these presumptively 
preempted and nonpreempted categories? As I noted at the outset of this 
Article, the OCC repeatedly invoked the idea of national uniformity to 
facilitate an interstate market in financial services.203 This argument for a 
single set of rules to control a single market is essentially an argument for 
field preemption to realize economies of scale in regulation. Using a term 
from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, one can characterize 
this rationale for preemption as an argument for market harmonization, that 
is, uniform rules for a national market.204 Because one set of rules can 
perform as well as fifty, the only effects of multiple rules are “costly and 
 
201 See infra notes 274-77 and accompanying text. 
202 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(3). 
203 See supra text accompanying notes 16-20. 
204 See generally PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW 635-36 (3d ed. 2003) (re-
viewing European Union case law and theory on market harmonization). 
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burdensome” compliance efforts that lead to “uncertain liabilities and poten-
tial exposure.”205 Uniform rules, on this account, generate benefits regardless 
of their content, because it is cheaper to learn and comply with one set of 
rules than with fifty. Professor Merrill terms such preemption the “dis-
placement” of state law that “radically simplifies the regulatory structure in 
any given area, replacing a mélange of federal, state, and local requirements 
with a single set of federal rules.”206 As Merrill notes, such policy rests on a 
general judgment “about the benefits and costs of legal uniformity,” not on an 
individualized determination that some particular state rule interferes with 
any specific federal rule.207 In short, despite the OCC’s disclaimers to the 
contrary,208 the OCC’s rationale for its 2004 rules, with its emphasis on the 
overall benefits of regulatory uniformity209 regardless of the content of any 
specific state banking rule, institutes a regime of field preemption. 
The difficulty with the market harmonization rationale is that McCulloch’s 
distinction between general and banking-specific laws was designed for an 
entirely different purpose: the protection of nationally chartered banks from 
hostile state legislation. By leaving states’ general common law doctrines 
largely intact, the OCC has pursued the goal of national uniformity with 
extraordinary underinclusiveness. The irrationality of the OCC’s rules is 
only exacerbated by the OCC’s failure to provide any coherent rule for 
when general state law constitutes permissible “legal infrastructure” for 
banking,210 as opposed to an impermissible impediment to national banks’ 
powers. 
That common law claims can have the same regulatory purposes and 
effects as rules enforced by administrative agencies is hardly a novelty. As the 
Supreme Court now regularly announces, a liability award “can be, indeed is 
designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling 
policy.”211 Moreover, the generality of the underlying common law standard 
 
205 Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 
1908 (Jan. 13, 2004). 
206 Merrill, supra note 102, at 732. 
207 Id. at 733. 
208 See Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 43,549, 43,556 (July 21, 2011) (“[T]hese rules are not based on a field preemption standard. 
They were based on the OCC’s conclusion that the listed types and terms of state laws would be 
preempted by application of the conflict preemption standard of the Barnett decision.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
209 See, e.g., id. at 43,554 (“Throughout our history, uniform national standards have proved 
to be a powerful engine for prosperity and growth.”). 
210 Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1895, 1896 (Jan. 13, 2004). 
211 Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261, 1269 (2012) (quoting San Diego Bldg. 
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959)). 
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does not mitigate its regulatory purpose and effect. If a bank is held liable 
for abusive debt collection practices, the fact that the underlying common 
law or statutory cause of action is not specific to the defendant’s identity as a 
bank does not change the bank’s incentives. Regardless of the underlying state 
rule’s general phrasing, the bank will still have to change its behavior or face 
(using the OCC’s phrase) “uncertain liabilities and potential exposure.”212 
As the Supreme Court has noted, “[T]here is little reason why state im-
pairment of the federal scheme should be deemed acceptable so long as it is 
effected by the particularized application of a general statute.”213 In short, 
the OCC’s ban on state laws that single out banking practices is completely 
orthogonal to their rationale of harmonizing markets. 
Aware that even general state laws can effectively regulate banking activ-
ities in precisely the same ways as banking-specific state laws, the OCC does 
not automatically give blanket approval to any state law that is general in 
form.214 Instead, the OCC’s rules provide that general state laws escape 
preemption only if they are “not inconsistent with the real estate lending 
powers of national banks” and “only incidentally affect the exercise of 
national banks’ real estate lending powers.”215  
But what does it mean for a state law to affect banking “incidentally”? 
The OCC has invoked the metaphor of “legal infrastructure” to explain 
“incidental” effects, stating that the critical question is whether or not the 
state laws “form the legal infrastructure that makes it practicable to exercise 
a permissible Federal power.”216 General laws that constitute such “legal 
infrastructure” are not preempted, because their effects on banking are 
“incidental.” By contrast, state laws that “attempt to regulate the manner or 
content of national banks’ real estate lending” are preempted even if those 
laws are general in form.217 
The term “legal infrastructure,” however, is a metaphor vainly searching 
for some unambiguous definition. The OCC is correct that, at least since 
Erie and arguably since 1882 (when national banks lost their automatic right 
to remove litigation to federal courts),218 national banks have depended on 
 
212 Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 
1908 (Jan. 13, 2004). 
213 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 386 (1992). 
214 “The label a state attaches to its laws will not affect the analysis of whether that law is 
preempted.” Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. at 
1912 n.59. 
215 Id. at 1917 (quoting regulation now codified at 12 C.F.R. § 34(b) (2006)). 
216 Id. at 1912. 
217 Id. 
218 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
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state law to avoid anarchy because there has been no general federal common 
law to define banks’ powers to engage in the banking business.219 But the 
goal of insuring nationally uniform rules for national banks cannot explain 
why all state common law doctrines should escape preemption while the 
states’ banking-specific laws should be set aside. Both types of rules seek to 
remedy evils within the banking business, such as consumer ignorance, 
unequal bargaining power, deceptive trade practices, problems in proving 
consent arising from forgery, duress, and the like. Why should the limits on 
enforcement of unconscionable bargains contained in a state’s common law 
of contracts be exempted from preemption, as “legal infrastructure” necessary 
for banking business, while similar state banking rules about mandatory 
disclosures to customers are preempted?  
The metaphor of “infrastructure” by itself obviously will not answer this 
question. One gets the sense that the OCC regards legitimate common law 
rules as paving a road over which banking bargains can be driven, while 
preempted rules constitute roadblocks and impediments to commerce. But 
the distinction implied by the metaphor turns out to be malleable and con-
fusing: Roads, after all, need rules, traffic signs, and signals if traffic is to 
move smoothly. Such rules can slow traffic down and redirect it to safe routes 
as well as speed it up. How, then, can one distinguish those commerce-
guiding rules that facilitate banking business from those that impermissibly 
impede it? 
The OCC has nothing to say on the definition of “legal infrastructure” 
that is neither tautological nor patently incorrect. Take, for instance, the 
following passage from the OCC’s explanation of its rule on visitorial 
powers, in which the OCC explains that “legal infrastructure” 
typically does not affect the content or extent of the Federally-authorized 
business of banking conducted by national banks, but rather establishes the 
legal infrastructure that surrounds and supports the ability of national 
banks—and others—to do business. In other words, these state laws provide 
a framework for a national bank’s ability to exercise powers granted under 
Federal law; they do not obstruct or condition a national bank’s exercise of 
those powers.220 
 
219 Cf. O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 88 (1994) (“Uniformity of law might facili-
tate the [FDIC’s] nationwide litigation of these suits, eliminating state-by-state research and 
reducing uncertainty—but if the avoidance of those ordinary consequences qualified as an 
identifiable federal interest, we would be awash in ‘federal common-law’ rules.”). 
220 Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1895, 1896 (Jan. 13, 2004). 
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This statement, taken literally, is absurd. How can it be that a common 
law contract rule “typically does not affect the content or extent . . . of 
the . . . business of banking”? Common law rules provide contractual 
procedures that are designed to reduce fraud and deception, increase 
parties’ information, and otherwise ensure that bargains reflect preferences. 
By definition, such rules change the content of bargains by eliminating 
fraudulent bargains and promoting honest ones. Likewise, contract law 
regularly reduces the extent of bargains by rendering some contracts illegal 
that might otherwise be enforced. As the McClellan Court noted—in a case 
approved by the OCC221—“Of course, in the broadest sense, any limitation 
by a State on the making of contracts is a restraint upon the power of a 
national bank within the State to make such contracts,” such as those for 
“the taking of real estate, as a security for an antecedent debt.”222 If a state 
bars a sixteen-year-old from making a credit card contract, it will diminish 
the extent of credit card contracts, but the OCC would surely not regard 
this law as impermissibly impeding national banks’ powers to make loans or 
take deposits. 
The confusion inherent in the OCC’s concept of “legal infrastructure” is 
well illustrated by the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Monroe Retail, Inc. v. RBS 
Citizens, N.A.223 The issue in Monroe Retail was whether national banks 
violated Ohio’s anti-conversion law by charging between twenty-five and 
eighty dollars to garnish debtors’ bank accounts on behalf of creditor-
retailers. The retailers argued that, because Ohio law allowed banks to charge 
only one dollar to garnish debtors’ bank accounts, the extra fees charged by 
the banks (which frequently left no money to satisfy the garnishor-creditors’ 
claims) constituted illegal conversion under Ohio law.224 In response, the 
banks argued that Ohio’s conversion laws were preempted by the OCC’s 
rules barring state laws that limited activity incidental to receiving deposits, 
such as charging fees.225 According to the banks, the rules’ protection for 
“[r]ights to collect debts”226 applied only to the banks’ rights to collect debts: 
 
221 See, e.g., Letter from John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, to Sen. Paul S. 
Sarbanes 2-3 & n.3, 4 & n.15 (Dec. 9, 2003), available at http://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-
actions/SarbanesPreemptionletter.pdf. 
222 McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 358 (1896). 
223 589 F.3d 274 (6th Cir. 2009). 
224 Id. at 277. 
225 See id. The rule is codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.4007(a) (2012) (“A national bank may . . . 
engage in any activity incidental to receiving deposits . . . .”). 
226 12 C.F.R. § 7.4007(c)(4). 
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the very same state law could be preempted or not preempted depending on 
whether a bank was seeking the benefit of the law.227 
Not surprisingly, the Sixth Circuit rejected this one-sided view of banking 
preemption, simply because it “defie[d] common sense.”228 Despite its 
absurdity, that view was consistent with the literal meaning of the OCC’s 
opinion that state law counts as part of the permissible “legal infrastructure” 
only if it does not “obstruct or condition a national bank’s exercise of 
[federally conferred] powers.”229 But if a national bank loses a case as a result 
of state law, then how have its powers not been obstructed or conditioned? 
The OCC, in short, has adopted a definition of permissible “legal infra-
structure” with literal terms that are absurd and, therefore, untenable.230 Yet 
it is not obvious how the absurdity can be cured short of simply enforcing 
every generally applicable state law that does not subject the business of 
banking to any special conditions. With a few exceptions, this is the course 
that lower courts have taken. Thus, courts have consistently sided with the 
OCC’s efforts to preempt state regulations specifically directed toward 
banking practices. They have rejected state efforts to subject national banks 
to comprehensive licensing schemes,231 mandated disclosures,232 various forms 
of price regulation for ATM fees or check-cashing,233 anti-usury limits on 
interest rates,234 or (most controversially) bans on “predatory” lending 
 
227 Monroe Retail, 589 F.3d at 282.  
228 Id.  
229 Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1895, 1896 (Jan. 13, 2004). 
230 In other scenarios, the Supreme Court has rejected the literal meaning of text that pro-
duced an absurd legal asymmetry between the rights of parties. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry 
Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509-10 (1989) (“No matter how plain the text of the Rule may be, we 
cannot accept an interpretation that would deny a civil plaintiff the same right to impeach an 
adversary’s testimony that it grants to a civil defendant.”). 
231 See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank v. Boutris, 419 F.3d 949, 965-66 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that 
the OCC’s regulations preempted California’s system for licensing real estate lending); Wachovia 
Bank v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 309 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the National Banking Act and OCC 
rules preempted Connecticut’s licensing requirements for a mortgage subsidiary of a national bank). 
232 See, e.g., Rose v. Chase Bank USA, 513 F.3d 1032, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that the 
National Bank Act’s authorization to “loan money on personal security” preempted California’s 
requirement of specific disclosures accompanying bank offers of credit cards (citation omitted)). 
233 See, e.g., Nat’l City Bank of Ind. v. Turnbaugh, 463 F.3d 325, 331-33 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that federal regulations preempted a Maryland law that restricted the amount of prepayment fees 
a national bank or its mortgage lending subsidiaries could impose upon borrowers); Wells Fargo 
Bank of Tex. v. James, 321 F.3d 488, 495 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that an OCC regulation 
permitting national banks to charge “non-interest charges and fees” preempted a Texas law 
prohibiting check-cashing fees (citation omitted)); Bank of Am. v. City and County of San 
Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 566 (9th Cir. 2002) (striking down San Francisco’s ban on banks’ charging 
non–account holders for use of ATM machines). 
234 Discover Bank v. Vaden, 489 F.3d 594, 605-06 (4th Cir. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 556 
U.S. 49 (2009). 
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practices.235 But courts have also allowed a wide variety of private claims 
rooted in more general state common law doctrines or general statutes 
defining anti-consumer fraud. These claims include allegations that either 
national banks or mortgage servicers claiming to act on their behalf should 
be held liable for engaging in deception in the sale of liens;236 unconscionably 
skimming home equity with fraudulent appraisals or overestimating bor-
rowers’ income in approving loans;237 involuntarily enrolling people in credit 
card programs in violation of a state false claims act;238 unconscionably 
harassing debtors to collect payment in violation of a state consumer 
protection statute;239 turning tax refund–anticipation loan proceeds over to 
other banks to satisfy plaintiffs’ preexisting debts in violation of state debt 
collection rules;240 wrongfully demanding excessive service charges in 
 
235 North Carolina was the first state to enact a statute banning banking practices targeting 
low-income and unsophisticated borrowers to induce them to borrow more than they could repay 
and thereby generate loan origination fees or strip borrowers of home equity. See Act of July 22, 
1999, 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws 332 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 24-1.1A to -10.2 (2012)). Georgia 
followed with a statute of its own in 2004. See Georgia Fair Lending Act, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-
6A-1 to -13 (2012), invalidated by Salvador v. Bank of Am. (In re Salvador), 456 B.R. 610 (Bankr. 
M.D. Ga. 2011). The OCC’s rules preempting state regulation of lending and deposit-taking were 
promulgated shortly thereafter, in response to Georgia’s statute. See Bank Activities and Opera-
tions; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 1908 ( Jan. 13, 2004). 
236 See, e.g., Gerber v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 11-01083, 2012 WL 413997, at *4-9 (D. Ariz. Feb. 
9, 2012) (rejecting the argument, at the motion to dismiss stage, that the National Bank Act 
preempted a consumer fraud claim for deception where the plaintiff claimed that the seller failed 
to disclose the junior status of a lien it sold him). 
237 See, e.g., Conrad v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 08-0829, 2009 WL 36478, at *2-3 (S.D. W. Va. 
Jan. 5, 2009) (finding no preemption of claims that a bank engaged in a pattern of home equity 
skimming and predatory lending practices to make unfair loans based on fraudulent appraisals); 
Moore v. Wells Fargo Bank (In re Moore), 470 B.R. 390, 396 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 2012) (holding that 
the “claims of unconscionability in this case are not preempted by the National Banking Act”). 
238 See, e.g., Arevalo v. Bank of Am., 850 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1024-28 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (allowing 
claims under California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act and False Advertising Law for involuntarily 
enrolling plaintiff in a credit card program, against a national bank, over its preemption defense). 
239 See, e.g., Cline v. Bank of Am., 823 F. Supp. 2d 387, 398-99 (S.D. W. Va. 2011) (holding 
that the National Bank Act and the OCC’s implementing regulations did not preempt a borrower’s 
claims against a mortgage servicer for misrepresentation and unconscionable and unfair debt 
collection practices, in violation of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act); Smith 
v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, 769 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1046-47 (S.D. W. Va. 2011) (same). 
240 See, e.g., Hood v. Santa Barbara Bank & Trust, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 369, 382-83 (Ct. App. 
2006) (holding that the OCC’s deposit-taking and lending regulations did not preempt state tort 
claims or debt collection laws). 
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connection with mortgage foreclosure,241 and fraudulently adjusting the 
order in which ATM fees are posted in order to maximize overdraft fees.242 
It is easy to see that virtually any banking-specific prohibition can be 
reframed as a general common law or statutory theory under a law that 
makes no particular mention of banking. Indeed, some courts have allowed 
general state law claims of unfair trade practices, even when these claims 
incorporate statutory standards peculiar to lending as the standards for 
liability. In Aguayo v. U.S. Bank, for instance, the Ninth Circuit characterized 
the California Rees-Levering Act’s post-repossession notice requirements as 
pertaining to “rights to collect debts”—a nonpreempted category under the 
OCC’s rules—rather than as “concerning [d]isclosure and advertising” (a 
preempted category, according to the OCC).243 The notice requirements 
were not vague common law injunctions to be “fair” or avoid “fraud” but 
rather bright-line regulatory mandates to provide detailed information to 
the borrower after the lender repossesses a motor vehicle for nonpayment of 
a loan.244 Because the plaintiff had challenged the bank’s noncompliance in a 
private claim brought under California’s Unfair Competition Law, the 
Aguayo court treated the state’s regulatory mandates as fitting in with other 
private law claims that the OCC seemed to preserve.245 
Even when courts disallow general claims for effectively targeting banking 
practices, they offer no clear criteria for distinguishing permissible from 
preempted state rules. Thus, the power to invoke preemption of general 
state law hangs on arbitrary and unpredictable matters of legal characteriza-
tion. In Martinez v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held 
that the plaintiff ’s state law claim alleging fraudulent failure to disclose 
 
241 See, e.g., In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortg. Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638, 643 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (finding that the Office of Thrift Supervision’s rules implementing the Home Owners’ 
Loan Act do not “deprive persons harmed by the wrongful acts of savings and loan associations of 
their basic state common-law-type remedies”). 
242 See, e.g., In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1313-14 (S.D. Fla. 
2010) (holding that claims challenging “the allegedly unlawful manner in which the banks operate 
their overdraft programs to maximize fees at the expense of consumers” under state law for using 
largest-to-smallest posting policies were not preempted by the OCC’s 2011 rules authorizing 
noninterest fees or its guidance allowing posting of withdrawals in any order); White v. Wachovia 
Bank, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1366-69 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (holding that the OCC’s 2004 rules did not 
preempt a claim of maximizing overdraft fees). 
243 653 F.3d 912, 918, 925-26 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008(e)(4) & (d)(2)(viii) 
(2010), respectively), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 106 (2012). 
244 Id. at 924-28. 
245 See id. (“The district court’s broad reading of the terms ‘disclosure’ and ‘other credit-
related documents’ would effectively preempt any document related to debt collection, something 
the OCC was acutely aware of when deliberately choosing the final language of the preemption 
rule to save such state laws.” (quoting Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and 
Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 1912 ( Jan. 13, 2004))). 
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closing costs was preempted by the OCC’s rule authorizing noninterest 
charges and fees.246 The court offered no reason why the state law claim 
should be preempted as a regulation of fees and charges rather than permitted 
as a state contract or tort claim under the OCC’s rule preserving state 
common law. Martinez and other decisions like it247 seem to be based on 
nothing more than arbitrary characterizations of private claims as either 
nonpreempted contract, tort, or collection-of-debts claims, or as preempted 
regulation-of-banks claims. 
The OCC’s rules, in short, invite unpredictable and unprincipled argu-
ments about whether a state law should be characterized as “infrastructure” 
that “incidentally” affects banking or as a significant impairment to banking. 
But this is not the only sort of unpredictability promoted by the rules. 
General common law theories of fraud are rooted in loosely defined legal 
standards that are shored up in a specific case only after a verdict is ren-
dered. By contrast, state laws specifically directed toward banking crisply 
define duties that banks can easily identify before disputes arise. If market 
harmonization is the goal, why seek to prohibit the predictable legal duty 
defined ex ante in a statute or regulation, but allow the vague and un-
predictable legal duty enforced ex post through damages?  
The paradox is well illustrated by the California Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Parks v. MBNA America Bank, in which the court struck down a 
California statute regulating so-called “convenience checks.”248 The court 
held that this state law, requiring specific disclosures to be printed on the 
fronts of preprinted checks sent to credit card holders,249 was preempted by 
the National Bank Act, because it limited banks’ powers to enter into 
personal credit lending agreements.250 In reaching this conclusion, however, 
the court distinguished Perdue v. Crocker National Bank,251 in which it had 
held that federal banking laws did not preempt state law theories that bank 
charges for overdrawn accounts were based on unconscionable contracts.252 
 
246 598 F.3d 549, 556 (9th Cir. 2010). 
247 See, e.g., Wier v. Countrywide Bank, No. 10-11468, 2011 WL 1256944, at *4 (E.D. Mich. 
Mar. 31, 2011) (finding preemption of state law fraudulent inducement and misrepresentation claims); 
Austin v. Provident Bank, No. 04-00033, 2005 WL 1785285, at *6 (N.D. Miss. Jul. 26, 2005) 
(finding preemption of a common law fraud claim that lenders deliberately targeted disadvantaged 
individuals in need of financing who were more vulnerable to the defendants’ practices of selling 
loans at excessive interest rates). 
248 278 P.3d 1193, 1194-1204 (Cal. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 653 (2012). 
249 Id. at 1195. 
250 Id. at 1199. 
251 702 P.2d 503 (Cal. 1985). 
252 Id. at 523. 
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The Parks court reasoned that the disclosure requirement at issue, unlike the 
state laws regarding unconscionability in Perdue,  
does not state a background legal principle against fraudulent, deceptive, or 
unconscionable practices. It prescribes specific and affirmative conduct that 
credit card issuers must undertake if they wish to lend money through con-
venience checks. Unlike the state law considered in Perdue, the disclosure 
requirements . . . cannot be understood as part of the general legal backdrop 
to Congress’s enactment of federal banking legislation.253 
The passage illustrates the paradox of the OCC’s distinction: How does 
it reduce the costs of banks’ compliance with multiple state laws by 
preempting requirements of “specific and affirmative conduct” in favor of 
amorphous “background legal principles” barring “unconscionable” conduct? 
Surely, the latter deters as many or more banking practices than the former, 
if only because unpredictable liability requires the bank to tailor its conduct 
to create a margin of safety. 
In sum, the OCC’s preemption rule is both too broad and too narrow to 
produce uniform and predictable national rules that advance the goal of 
market harmonization. If the OCC simply wanted to avoid subjecting banks 
to conflicting state regulatory standards, then it could promulgate rules to 
resolve such conflicts if and when they do in fact occur, just as the Supreme 
Court grants certiorari review to resolve conflicts among the circuit courts 
of appeals. The OCC’s rule, however, goes much further, by barring any 
state from adopting banking-specific rules even when such rules conflict 
with no other states’ laws—indeed, even when the states converge on a 
common regulatory standard. Moreover, the OCC’s rule does not go far 
enough to provide a genuinely uniform legal regime for banks, because the 
rule does little to resolve conflicts among states’ common law rules. 
 This mismatch between rule and reason might be a ground for striking 
down the former under arbitrary and capricious review.254 Although the 
standards of justification under the Administrative Procedure Act are 
deferential, an agency must nevertheless articulate in the administrative 
record the actual basis for its actions.255 That principle might apply all the 
more powerfully to the OCC’s preemption rules, because there are good 
reasons to be skeptical about McCulloch’s principle that private bankers 
 
253 Parks, 278 P.3d at 1202. 
254 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). 
255 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43-44 & n.9 (1983) (“The reviewing court should not attempt itself to make up 
for such deficiencies; we may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency 
itself has not given.” (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947))). 
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constitute federal instrumentalities entitled to exercise autonomous judgment 
free from governmental oversight. By hiding behind largely irrelevant 
rhetoric about the importance of national regulatory uniformity for inter-
state commerce, the OCC has avoided substantive analysis of McCulloch’s 
principle of the independence of federal instrumentalities from state law—
the very principle that seems to be the actual basis for its rules. 
B. Are the OCC’s Preemption Rules Consistent with  
the Dodd-Frank Act’s Standards for Preemption? 
Quite apart from the OCC’s compliance with principles of administrative 
rationality, the OCC’s 2011 rules are arguably inconsistent with section 
1044(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act. The question turns on whether or not one 
reads section 1044(a) as a reassertion of the anti-banker nondelegation 
doctrine. There is both statutory text and legislative history suggesting that 
section 1044(a) finally repudiates the sort of categorical field preemption 
that, under McCulloch and its post–Civil War progeny, precluded states 
from enforcing banking-specific rules against nationally chartered banks. 
One might reasonably construe section 1044(a) as a third rejection256 of the 
idea of granting private banks broad powers of self-governance free from 
state or federal oversight. So construed, the OCC’s 2011 rules might fall 
outside section 1044(a), to the extent that they adopt such across-the-board 
preemption of state law without providing some federal substitute. 
Section 1044(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act provides an elaborate set of rules 
to govern preemption of “state consumer financial laws.”257 Under Dodd-
Frank’s preemption standard, “state consumer financial laws” would be 
preempted by federal banking laws only if they discriminate against national 
banks or “prevent[] or significantly interfere[] with the exercise by the 
national bank of its powers” as measured according to “the legal standard 
for preemption in” Barnett Bank.258 The Dodd-Frank Act specifically 
requires such preemption determinations to be made “on a case-by-case 
basis” after analysis of “the impact of a particular State consumer financial 
law on any national bank that is subject to that law,”259 with those case-by-
case determinations supported by “substantial evidence, made on the record 
 
256 The first two rejections were Andrew Jackson’s 1832 campaign against Nicholas Biddle 
and Louis Brandeis’s 1912 campaign against the House of Morgan. See supra Sections I.A & II.A. 
257 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 1044(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2014-17 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b (2006, Supp. IV 2011)). 
258 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B) (citing Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 
(1996)). 
259 Id. § 25b(b)(3)(A). 
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of the proceeding.”260 The statute also specifically rejects “field” preemption 
of any area of state law under the Act.261  
But the meaning of the Barnett Bank standard, incorporated by section 
1044(a), is ambiguous. On the one hand, in Barnett Bank, the Court held 
that a Florida law was preempted because it banned certain banks from 
engaging in the business of selling insurance, thereby implying that some 
state laws were preempted because they barred banking activities permissible 
under federal law.262 On the other hand, merely banning a banking activity 
permitted by federal law does not always “impair significantly” banking 
powers.263 Otherwise, the Barnett Bank Court could not have approvingly 
cited Anderson National Bank v. Luckett264 for the proposition that federal 
banking law does not “deprive States of the power to regulate national 
banks, where (unlike here) doing so does not prevent or significantly interfere 
with the national bank’s exercise of its powers.”265 Congress therefore might 
have deliberately adopted a vague legal standard to avoid resolving the 
contentious question of the precise degree to which federal law preempted 
state banking rules.  
The scope of federal preemption was hotly contested after the OCC’s 
2004 rules were invoked to preempt states’ prohibitions on predatory 
lending. Consumer advocates, claiming that the OCC had been captured by 
the banks on which it was dependent for revenue (in the form of chartering 
fees), attempted to shrink the scope of banking preemption as much as 
possible.266 These advocates’ complaints were not baseless: as Professor 
Arthur Wilmarth has exhaustively documented, federal regulatory authorities, 
 
260 Id. § 25b(c). 
261 Id. § 25b(b)(4). 
262 Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 32-38. 
263 Id. at 33. 
264 321 U.S. 233 (1944). 
265 Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33 (citing Luckett, 321 U.S. at 247-52). 
266 See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 
86-95 (2008) (“The OCC’s inaction may also be attributable, at least in part, to its direct financial 
stake in keeping its bank clients happy. Large national banks fund a significant portion of the 
OCC’s budget.”); Vincent Di Lorenzo, Federalism, Consumer Protection and Regulatory Preemption: A 
Case for Heightened Judicial Review, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 273, 281 (2008) (“[T]he OCC has 
not acted as a neutral forum to resolve conflicting policies. Rather it has acted as an advocate for 
the interests of national banks and therefore as an advocate for the broadest possible preemption 
of state law.”); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Cuomo v. Clearing House: The Supreme Court Responds to 
the Subprime Financial Crisis and Delivers a Major Victory for the Dual Banking System and Consumer 
Protection (noting that the OCC’s rules have relieved banks from having to follow state laws 
protecting consumers), in THE PANIC OF 2008: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR REFORM 295, 307-10 & 335 n.89 (Lawrence E. Mitchell & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. eds., 
2010); Wilmarth, supra note 65, at 356 (noting that the OCC has failed to issue any enforcement 
order against any of the eight largest national banks). 
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including the OCC, repeatedly failed to regulate banking practices that 
turned out to be detrimental to consumers.267 However, the banks’ advocates 
in Congress, like Representative Melissa Bean of Illinois, have tried to 
preserve the preemption provided by existing precedent.268 Barnett Bank 
was a convenient vehicle by which these pro- and anti-bank factions could 
compromise through what Professor Victoria Nourse has termed “structure-
induced ambiguity,”269 thereby sidestepping gridlock in the bicameral 
process.  
One does not, however, have to know how Barnett Bank defines sig-
nificant impairment of banking powers to determine that Barnett Bank 
unambiguously rejects McCulloch. Barnett’s embrace of Luckett, as noted 
above in Part II, suggests as much. Likewise, under the in pari materia 
canon, section 1044(a) incorporates the Court’s 2009 decision in Cuomo v. 
Clearing House Ass’n270 just as clearly as it incorporates Luckett, because the 
Clearing House Court construed the Barnett Bank standard on the eve of 
section 1044(a)’s enactment. The Clearing House Court expressly rejected the 
distinction between general state laws and state laws specifically targeting 
banking. The Court observed that the distinction, proposed by the OCC to 
justify its ban on enforcement of state fair lending laws, “can be found 
nowhere within the text of the statute” and, therefore, “attempts to do what 
Congress declined to do: exempt national banks from all state banking laws, 
or at least state enforcement of those laws.”271 
Section 1044(a)’s requirements for preemption determinations further 
suggest the rejection of broad McCulloch-style preemption.272 Like the 
Barnett Bank standard itself, these procedural requirements are not self-
explanatory. By requiring some sort of “case-by-case” examination of the 
“impact” of “particular” state laws, these provisions preclude preemption on 
the basis of the mere linguistic form of a state law. Yet the OCC’s preemption 
 
267 Wilmarth, supra note 174, at 897-919 (documenting repeated instances of federal agencies’ 
failing to regulate credit practices harmful to consumers). 
268 See 155 CONG. REC. E3029 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2009) (statement of Rep. Melissa Bean) 
(arguing for statutory preservation of the Barnett Bank standard). For a brief overview of the 
preemption provision’s contested legislative history, see Sharpe, supra note 4, at 221-23. 
269 Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian 
Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1129-30 (2011); see id. (arguing that the 
difficulty of passing legislation encourages statutory ambiguity). 
270 557 U.S. 519 (2009). 
271 Id. at 533. 
272 See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(3)(A) (2006) (requiring that preemption decisions be made “on a 
case-by-case basis” after analysis of “the impact of a particular State consumer financial law on any 
national bank that is subject to that law”); id. § 25b(c) (requiring preemption decisions to be 
supported by “substantial evidence, made on the record of the proceeding”). 
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of state laws based on their generality seems like precisely that sort of 
merely formal, linguistic inquiry.  
Section 1044(a), in sum, seems finally and unambiguously to overrule 
McCulloch’s field preemption of state laws targeting banking activities for 
special regulatory treatment. With what exact standard section 1044(a) 
replaces McCulloch’s test remains ambiguous, but section 1044(a) unambigu-
ously eliminates McCulloch’s ban on banking-specific laws after almost two 
centuries of on-again, off-again existence. 
Do the OCC’s 2011 rules constitute an implicit endorsement of McCul-
loch’s theory of preemption? Those rules, to the outrage of critics,273 largely 
copied the 2004 rules. While making necessary adjustments regarding the 
exclusivity of the OCC’s visitorial powers to accommodate the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Clearing House, the OCC largely left intact its 2004 rules 
preempting broad categories of state laws.274 The OCC listed categories of 
state laws that were preempted, all of which specifically regulated deposit-
taking or lending operations, while more general state laws that did not 
specifically refer to banking activities were saved “to the extent consistent 
with” the Barnett Bank decision.275 In defense of its decision to double down 
on its 2004 revival of McCulloch’s approach to preemption, the OCC stated 
 
273 For some characteristic criticisms, see Press Release, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., Statement 
of NCLC Managing Attorney Lauren Saunders on OCC Final Preemption Rule (July 20, 2011), 
available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/preemption/occ-preemption-statement.pdf (accusing 
the OCC of “thumb[ing] its nose at state efforts to protect consumers”). The OCC acknowledged 
that some commenters believed that “by retaining . . . rules that preempt categories of state laws, 
that the propos[ed rules] would circumvent the Dodd-Frank Act procedural and consultation 
requirements. These commenters asserted that the preemption of categories and/or terms of state 
laws is equivalent to ‘occupation of the field,’ rather than conflict, preemption.” Office of Thrift 
Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,549, 43,553 (July 21, 2011). 
274 The OCC deleted the reference in its 2004 rules to state laws “obstruct[ing], impair[ing], 
or condition[ing]” national banks’ powers, 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a) (2005). See Office of Thrift 
Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,556 (“[T]he words 
‘obstruct, impair or condition’ as used in the 2004 preemption rules were intended to reflect the 
precedents cited in Barnett, not to create a new preemption standard. Nevertheless, we 
acknowledge that the phrase created confusion and misunderstanding . . . . For these reasons, the 
OCC is deleting the phrase . . . .”). Having made these minor modifications, the OCC asserted 
that its “rules are not based on a field preemption standard,” but rather on its “conclusion that the 
listed types and terms of state laws would be preempted by application of the conflict preemption 
standard of the Barnett decision.” Id. at 43,556. But this explanation seems to reduce to the 
assertion that avoiding the magical word “field” thus renders its provisions only conflict preemption 
provisions. See, e.g., id. at 43,557 n.48 (contrasting the OCC’s rules with the Office of Thrift 
Supervision’s rules that “assert an ‘occupation of the field’ preemption standard” (quoting 12 
C.F.R. § 560.2 (2011)) (citing 12 C.F.R. § 557.11))). The OCC’s reasoning does little to answer 
commenters charge that its rules simply field preempt state laws through the enumeration of 
categories. 
275 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(b) (2012). 
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that its 2004 rules had been expressly designed to be consistent with the 
Court’s decision in Barnett Bank.276 Since the Dodd-Frank Act specifically 
incorporated this standard, the OCC regarded its old rules as consistent 
with the new statutory language. As for the requirements for a case-by-case 
analysis of particular state laws’ impact backed by substantial evidence in 
the record, the OCC argued that these were procedural requirements not 
intended to apply retroactively to rules enacted before the Dodd-Frank Act 
became effective.277 
Consider three reasons why the OCC’s 2004 and 2011 rules are best under-
stood as adopting McCulloch’s federal instrumentality theory of field 
preemption. 
First, the distinction drawn in the OCC’s rules between general state 
laws and banking-specific state laws is precisely the distinction adopted by 
nineteenth-century courts trying to extend McCulloch from taxation to 
regulation.278 The intuitively obvious point of declaring banking-specific 
laws to be a suspect classification is not to secure uniformity but rather to 
protect banks from hostile state legislation. In the nineteenth century, 
generally applicable common law rules were not regarded as posing a threat 
to the national banks’ federal mission; banking-specific laws, however, were. 
Second, the OCC devoted much of its justification for its rule to quota-
tions from opinions invoking McCulloch’s federal instrumentality theory, 
while ignoring or minimizing precedents that later abandoned the idea of 
federal instrumentalities’ immunity. Ignoring First National Bank of Bay City 
v. Fellows ex rel. Union Trust Co.,279 the OCC’s reasons for its rule on 
visitorial powers quoted heavily from Dearing280 and Easton281 while distin-
guishing First National Bank in St. Louis282 as resting on “a unique set of 
circumstances, now outdated.”283 The OCC made no mention of Justice Van 
Devanter’s dissenting opinion in First National Bank in St. Louis, joined by 
Chief Justice Taft, which stated that the majority’s decision undercut the 
 
276 Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed. Reg. 
at 43,566. 
277 See id. at 43,557 (“[T]hese provisions clearly apply to determinations made under the 
Barnett standard provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that are not effective until July 21, 2011. . . . 
Future preemption determinations would be subject to the new Dodd-Frank Act procedural 
provisions.”). 
278 See infra subsection I.B.2. 
279 244 U.S. 416 (1917). 
280 Farmers’ & Mechs.’ Nat’l Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29 (1875). 
281 Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220 (1903). 
282 First Nat’l Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640 (1924). 
283 Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1895, 1899 ( Jan. 13, 2004). For a discussion 
of these cases, see supra text accompanying notes 90-95. 
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basic premise of McCulloch.284 The OCC underscored how closely it was 
following the old jurisprudence by basing its list of nonpreempted areas 
closely on the Supreme Court’s language in National Bank v. Kentucky, 
including debt collection among the categories of nonpreempted laws,285 
because Kentucky included debt collection.286 The OCC’s current rule on 
deposit-taking grudgingly acknowledges that preemption of state laws on 
“[a]bandoned and dormant accounts”287 “does not apply to state laws of the 
type upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Anderson National Bank 
v. Luckett,”288 but the OCC says nothing whatsoever about Luckett’s reason-
ing—in particular, its rejection of the idea that federal law preempts all 
banking-specific laws. 
Third, the OCC copied the Office of Thrift Supervision’s (OTS) 1996 
rules defining preemption of state law under the Home Owners’ Loan Act 
of 1933 (HOLA),289 and the OTS’s rules were expressly rooted in McCul-
loch’s federal instrumentality theory of field preemption.290 The OTS’s 1996 
rules expressly declared that they occupied the fields of lending and deposit-
taking.291 This position followed the longstanding position of lower courts 
that the OTS and its predecessor agency, the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board (FHLBB), were both authorized by HOLA to impose field preemp-
tion on state laws regulating federally chartered savings and loans (S&Ls), a 
view implicitly approved by the Supreme Court.292 S&Ls were viewed as 
 
284 See First Nat’l Bank in St. Louis, 263 U.S. at 662-68 (Van Devanter, J., dissenting) (“It 
must be admitted that, in so far as the legislation of Congress does not provide otherwise, the 
general laws of a State have the same application to the ordinary transactions of a national 
bank . . . . But not so on questions of corporate power. . . . National banks, like other corporations, 
have such powers as their creator confers on them, expressly or by fair implication, and none 
other. . . . Only where those laws bring state laws into the problem,—as by enabling national banks 
to act as executors, administrators, etc., where that is permitted by state laws,—can the latter have 
any bearing on the question of corporate power—the privileges which the bank may exercise.”). 
285 Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 
1912 (Jan. 13, 2004); see 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(b)(5) (2005) (“Right to collect debts”). 
286 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 362 (1870) (“Their acquisition and transfer of property, their right 
to collect their debts, and their liability to be sued for debts, are all based on State law.”). 
287 12 C.F.R. § 7.4007(b)(1) (2012). 
288 Id. § 7.4007(b)(1) n.3 (citing Anderson Nat’l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944)). 
289 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461–1470 (2006). 
290 On the OCC’s copying of the OTS’s rules, see Bank Activities and Operations; Real 
Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1911 n.56 (“The list [of preempted state laws] is 
also substantially identical to the types of laws specified in a comparable regulation of the OTS. 
See 12 CFR 560.2(b).”). 
291 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (1996). 
292 In Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, the Court suggested that it would 
be broadly deferential to the preemption decisions of the FHLBB on the theory that the HOLA 
was “a radical and comprehensive response to the inadequacies of the existing state systems.” 458 
U.S. 141, 160 (1982) (quoting Conf. of Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1257 (9th 
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distinct from banks because of the former institutions’ status as fiscal agents 
of the federal government. During the 1930s and 1940s, the Home Owners’ 
Loan Corporation, an entity entirely controlled and capitalized by the 
federal government, was authorized to buy private mortgages in default 
from federally chartered S&Ls, by using U.S. bonds that were deposited in 
the S&Ls’ vaults for use in making direct loans to homeowners.293 Federally 
chartered S&Ls were, therefore, the federal government’s chosen agents for 
implementing a specifically defined stimulus measure using resources 
supplied by the federal government.294 Courts emphasized federally char-
tered S&Ls’ status as federal instrumentalities and relied on those associa-
tions’ federally assigned function of aiding distressed housing markets using 
federal funds.295 This line of reasoning eventually led a district court in 1951 
to find that Luckett did not apply to federally chartered S&Ls on the 
grounds that they primarily served as the federal government’s agents in 
stimulating the depressed housing market with federal revenue.296 
The FHLBB and OTS’s theory of field preemption, therefore, was rooted 
in precisely the logic of McCulloch—that is, the idea that the federal govern-
ment’s fiscal agents were entitled to immunity from state law. Such a theory 
was plausible, albeit controversial, when applied to Nicholas Biddle’s Second 
Bank of the United States, which had a unique status as the exclusive 
depository of federal revenues. The theory had some plausibility as well when 
applied to S&Ls that were effectively lending out federal revenue to aid in 
the federal mission of making homes available to distressed homeowners 
and home buyers. But as noted in Part II, such a “federal instrumentality” 
theory made little sense when applied to the thousands of nationally 
chartered banks that neither served as the federal government’s unique fiscal 
 
Cir. 1979), summarily aff ’d, 445 U.S. 921 (1980)). The de la Cuesta Court noted that “the Board need 
not feel bound by existing state law.” Id. at 162. 
293 For an overview of the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation and its relationship to federally 
chartered S&Ls under HOLA, see SUSAN HOFFMANN, POLITICS AND BANKING: IDEAS, PUBLIC 
POLICY, AND THE CREATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 169-73 (2001). 
294 See generally C. LOWELL HARRISS, HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOME OWNERS’ 
LOAN CORPORATION (1951) (providing a history of HOLA). 
295 See, e.g., Waterbury Sav. Bank v. Danaher, 20 A.2d 455, 463-64 (Conn. 1940) (distinguishing 
between state-chartered and federally chartered savings and loan associations to determine that 
only the latter were exempt from state laws requiring payment of unemployment insurance 
assessments). 
296 See California v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 319 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (“As 
to national banks, Congress expressly left open a field for state regulation and the application of 
state laws; but as to federal savings and loan associations, Congress made plenary, preemptive 
delegation to the Board to organize, incorporate, supervise and regulate, leaving no field for state 
supervision.”). 
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agents nor acted as lenders of federal aid to a federally subsidized economic 
sector.297 
The OCC has attempted to distance itself from the charge that, by 
copying the OTS’s rules, it adopted McCulloch’s “federal instrumentality” 
theory of field preemption. Although the OCC had invited comment on 
whether it should expressly adopt field preemption similar to that imposed 
by the OTS,298 its 2004 statement ultimately declared that “we decline to 
adopt the suggestion of these commenters that we declare that these 
regulations ‘occupy the field’ of national banks’ real estate lending, other 
lending, and deposit-taking activities.”299 The OCC’s 2004 renunciation of 
field preemption, however, was belied by its actions. The only point the 
various state laws declared to be preempted by the OCC’s 2004 and 2011 
rules held in common was their focus on deposit-taking and lending; rather 
than conduct any particularized inquiry into whether certain types of 
banking-specific laws might raise the costs of interstate banking, the OCC 
simply swept all such laws aside. The conclusion is irresistible that, in 2004, 
the OCC based its determinations about preemption exclusively on whether 
the state law in question focused on banking activities and found that such a 
focus alone was sufficient to preempt a state law. That the OCC was not 
adopting a position significantly different from the OTS’s theory of field 
preemption is further suggested by the OCC’s assertion in its 2004 statement 
of basis and purpose that “the effect of labeling [as either field or conflict 
preemption] is largely immaterial in the present circumstances.”300 
Mindful of the legal standard now contained in section 1044(a) of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, the OCC in 2011 carefully reiterated that it was applying 
Barnett Bank’s “conflict” standard of preemption by relying on “an evalua-
tion of the extent and nature of an impediment posed by state law to the 
exercise of a power granted national banks under Federal law.”301 Rejecting 
the idea that it needed to provide case-by-case evaluation of such impedi-
ments for rules promulgated before section 1044(a) was enacted, the OCC 
asserted, “Where the same type of impediment exists under multiple states’ 
laws, a single conclusion of preemption can apply to multiple laws that 
contain the same type of impediment—that generate the same type of 
 
297 See Wilmarth, supra note 65, at 242-44. 
298 Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 
1910 (Jan. 13, 2004). 
299 Id. at 1911. 
300 Id. 
301 Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed. Reg. 
43,549, 43,556 (July 21, 2011). 
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conflict with a Federally-granted power.”302 The analysis of such a “conflict” 
was, according to the OCC, what distinguished its variety of preemption 
from “the OTS’s preemption rules.”303  
This careful alteration of terminology, however, did not lead to any more 
specific explanation of how the state laws listed as preempted conflicted 
with any particular federal policy. Instead, the OCC generally asserted that 
“[t]he types and terms of laws that are set out in the 2004 preemption rules 
were based on the OCC’s experience with the potential impact of such laws 
on national bank powers and operations.”304 The OCC nowhere described 
that impact in anything but conclusory terms; it declared that “state laws 
that would affect the ability of national banks to underwrite and mitigate 
credit risk, manage credit risk exposures, and manage loan-related assets . . . 
would meaningfully interfere with fundamental and substantial elements of 
the business of national banks.”305 The essence of the OCC’s argument was 
simply that private banks have expertise in their business, and state laws 
that second guess such expertise are preempted by the Barnett Bank standard.  
These general statements, however, do not distinguish the preempted 
state laws from any of the common law rules that the OCC spared. Common 
law rules also obviously “affect whether and how the bank may offer a core 
banking product and manage some of its most basic funding functions in 
operating a banking business.”306 Why, then, is a negligence claim spared 
from preemption, while a more specific state regulation directed specifically 
to fraud prevention is preempted? The only plausible answer—and the 
answer given by lower courts307—is that a state law specifically addressing 
anti-fraud precautions targets banking operations, while the state common 
law claim is not specifically tailored to banks. This answer, however, suggests 
that the real driver behind the OCC’s distinctions is not the degree to 
which a state rule “affects” deposit-taking and lending, but rather the degree 
 
302 Id. 
303 Id. at 43,557 n.48. 
304 Id. at 43,557. 
305 Id. 
306 Id. 
307 “[T]here is nothing unique about national banks in considering that question,” because 
everyone “is under a duty not to base a commercial transaction upon a forgery, and the standards 
governing performance of that duty traditionally have been established by state common and 
statutory law.” Johnson v. Wachovia Bank, No. 05-2654, 2006 WL 278549, at *2 (D. Md. Feb. 2, 
2006). The Johnson court held that a widow’s claims for constructive fraud, negligence, fraud, 
violation of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act, and rescission were not preempted. Id. 
Lower courts have routinely recognized this. See, e.g., White v. Wachovia Bank, 563 F. Supp. 2d 
1358, 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (finding that federal law did not preempt plaintiff ’s state law contract 
claims); Great W. Res. v. Bank of Ark., No. 05-5152, 2006 WL 626375, at *3-4 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 13, 
2006) (declining to dismiss state law contract claims on grounds of preemption). 
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to which a state rule singles out such activities. This rule essentially revives 
McCulloch’s “federal instrumentality” rule designed to stop states from 
interfering with federal banking policy, not to minimize the costs of doing 
business in multiple states. 
The OCC’s failure in both 2004 and 2011 to articulate a plausible justifi-
cation for distinguishing between common law claims and state banking 
laws suggests that the OCC ought not to receive a great deal of deference 
for the distinction. Under section 1044(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act, the 
OCC’s preemption determinations are to be given Skidmore rather than 
Chevron deference.308 Although the distinction between these two species of 
deference is less than crystalline,309 Skidmore deference leaves basic policy 
questions for courts to resolve but authorizes courts to give “weight” to an 
agency’s judgment based on a sliding scale of multiple considerations, 
including the agency’s consistency, exercise of expertise, thoroughness, and 
so forth.310 On this account, section 1044(a) withholds from the OCC the 
basic task of determining whether banking preemption should be governed 
by McCulloch’s principle of “strict scrutiny” for banking-specific state laws. 
Instead, courts are to resolve the basic policy question left open by Barnett 
Bank by using the OCC as an expert body akin to a special master or expert 
witness that can answer more precise questions about the effects of state 
laws on national banking interests—but they are not to defer blindly to its 
interpretations. 
IV. OLD HICKORY’S REVENGE: THE CASE FOR CONDITIONING  
PREEMPTION ON THE OCC’S EXAMINATION OF  
THE RISKS ADDRESSED BY STATE LAW 
According to the OCC’s 2011 statement of basis and purpose, state 
banking laws targeting lending and deposit-taking operations “meaningfully 
interfere with fundamental and substantial elements of the business of 
national banks and with their responsibilities to manage that business and 
 
308 See supra note 11. 
309 For a summary of the conflicts among scholars and judges over whether Skidmore embodies 
an “independent judgment” or a “sliding scale” model of deference, see Kristin E. Hickman & 
Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1251-
59 (2007). 
310 See Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and 
“Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2012) (“‘Skidmore weight’ addresses the 
possibility that an agency’s view on a given statutory question may in itself warrant respect by 
judges who themselves have ultimate interpretive authority.”). Hickman & Krueger found that the 
great majority of courts follow a “sliding scale” approach to Skidmore deference. See Hickman & 
Krueger, supra note 309, at 1271 & tbl.1. 
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those risks.”311 The italicized word “their” perfectly encapsulates the assump-
tion behind those rules: under the OCC’s federal instrumentality theory of 
preemption, private bankers have the primary responsibility to manage the 
risks that they create. This ideal of protecting bankers’ autonomy lies at the 
heart of McCulloch and, more generally, the theory of privately owned 
federal instrumentalities. Whatever its protestations to the contrary, the 
OCC aggressively defends McCulloch’s idea that private banks, when they 
receive federal charters, are federal agencies in their own right, entitled to 
make banking policy even when that policy has not been reviewed by any 
genuinely federal official. 
Section 1044(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act is the latest political effort to cut 
back on the idea that federal agencies should treat private banks as if they 
were public agencies. Endorsing the anti-banker nondelegation doctrine, 
however, does not imply that state law should play the lead role, or even any 
ultimate role, in regulating nationally chartered banks. Like Jackson’s 1832 
campaign against Nicholas Biddle’s Second Bank and Brandeis’s 1912 
campaign against the House of Morgan, Dodd-Frank’s limits on preemption 
are designed not so much to preserve state law as to ensure that, if a state 
law is preempted, federal regulators carefully consider—“case-by-case”—the 
risks that such a state law attempts to mitigate. There are obvious reasons 
why national banks are optimally regulated by national agencies. Assessing 
the default risk—safety and soundness—of banks requires information 
about how and why panics and insolvency occur and some expert capacity to 
evaluate that information. It is likely that a national agency will be better 
situated to acquire that necessary expertise than fifty state agencies, for the 
usual reasons of scale economies and holdout problems in information 
acquisition. Financial products and services are sold across state lines; 
national banks operate at a national scale to pool reserves, achieve scale 
economies, and spread risks. For these reasons, replacing state with federal 
banking law might be ultimately the most sensible regime for nationally 
chartered banks. Such replacement, however, should involve a genuinely 
public agency’s evaluation of each state law’s costs and benefits and not 
merely an evaluation by a private entity regulated by the state law being 
evaluated. How can preemption doctrine be nudged in the direction of 
insuring such evaluations?  
In what follows, I make two suggestions for encouraging the OCC to 
exercise its expertise rather than delegate away its policy-making responsi-
bilities to private bankers. First, section 1044(a) should be construed to bar 
 
311 Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed. Reg. 
43,549, 43,557 (July 21, 2011) (emphasis added). 
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preemption of state law unless, in the course of the federal administrative 
process, the OCC makes specific findings of fact about why the mischief 
prohibited by a state law does not justify a limit on private bankers’ policy-
making discretion. Second, courts should consider functionally when 
suppression of state law is most desirable; they should require weaker 
evidence that the OCC has considered a risk when the OCC is suppressing 
some evil policy which state governments are unusually prone to promul-
gate. In particular, I suggest that courts ought to be quick to find preemp-
tion where state law (a) has an apparently protectionist purpose to insulate 
local providers of financial services from national banks’ competition or (b) 
expropriates national banks’ investments in a state. 
A. Prodding the OCC into Exercising Its Expertise 
Preemption under section 1044(a), rightly understood, can transform 
state law into a catalyst for the OCC’s careful consideration of banking 
risks. The essential ingredient of such a catalyzing preemption doctrine is 
what Professor Catherine Sharkey has termed the “agency reference” theory 
of preemption312: When a private party argues for preemption of some state 
law by the OCC’s rules under the National Bank Act, courts should demand 
some coherent argument—rooted in agency expertise—that the OCC has 
provided either a substitute federal rule or a reasoned analysis for why no 
rule is necessary. Such reasoned analysis would involve some assessment of 
the risk addressed by the challenged state law, the adequacy of existing 
federal rules to address that risk, or the adequacy of consumer information 
and market competition to address that risk absent any such federal rule. 
Ultimately, judicial assessment of the OCC’s administrative record would 
determine whether the OCC had made some judgment about banking risks 
that was inconsistent with the implicit judgment made by state law. In 
Professor Sharkey’s words, the OCC should provide “a fine-grained account 
of the precise regulatory review conducted by the agency and evidence as to 
its compatibility with state law . . . claims.”313 
Suppose, for instance, that a state legislature identifies some class of 
credit consumers who are prone to the specific risk of excessive debt—say, a 
risk that banks will market credit cards to college students who lack the 
 
312 For a discussion of the agency reference theory, see Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism 
Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2155-56 (2009) [hereinafter Sharkey, 
Federalism Accountability]; and Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional 
Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 477-84 (2008). 
313 Catherine M. Sharkey, Colloquy, What Riegel Portends for FDA Preemption of State Law 
Products Liability Claims, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 441 (2009).  
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maturity and financial skills to make responsible borrowing decisions. 
Suppose further that, responding to this perceived risk, the legislature 
prohibits the marketing of credit cards to college students except through an 
officially approved marketing policy with information about good credit 
management.314 Should the National Bank Act be construed to preempt 
such a law on the grounds that it places conditions on “incidental powers,” 
conferred by the National Bank Act, “necessary to carry on the business of 
banking”?315 The OCC’s preemption rule seems to preempt such state laws: 
it bars all state law limitations on “[d]isclosure and advertising, including 
laws requiring specific statements, information, or other content to be 
included in . . . credit solicitations.”316 In enacting this provision, however, 
the OCC never gave any consideration to the special risks posed by college 
students’ credit decisions. The OCC instead simply stated that “compliance 
with state-dictated disclosure requirements clearly present[s] a significant 
interference, within the meaning of Barnett, with the exercise of . . . national 
bank powers.”317 Preempting the state law under this very general rule 
would, therefore, allow banks to become the only entities to consider how 
banks’ own credit card marketing to college students should be regulated. 
This might make sense if credit markets, unaided by any special rules, 
functioned well. But the OCC has also made no findings about whether 
college students are well informed consumers of credit. To preempt state 
law by citing the OCC’s general declaration that states cannot impede 
banks’ marketing decisions is effectively to make the banks the final arbiters 
of their own marketing decisions. 
Does such a delegation of policymaking discretion to banks make any 
sense as a matter of policy? If banks were akin to federal field offices staffed 
by disinterested officers carrying out federal policy, the delegation would be 
no different than the delegation of powers to postmasters or U.S. Attorneys. 
But there is no reason to trust banks as such disinterested federal instru-
mentalities: American political history, from the days of Andrew Jackson to 
Brandeis to Dodd-Frank, suggests that Americans do not (and should not) 
trust bankers to such an extraordinary degree.  
The advantage of the agency reference theory is that it assigns the costs 
of formulating federal policies on specific banking risks to the parties most 
 
314 See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6437 (McKinney 2010) (“Each college shall prohibit the ad-
vertising, marketing, or merchandising of credit cards on college campuses to students, except 
pursuant to an official college credit card marketing policy.”).  
315 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2006). 
316 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008(d)(8) (2012). 
317 Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed. Reg. 
43,549, 43,557 ( July 21, 2011). 
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capable of bearing those costs—the banks regulated by the OCC. There are 
three advantages to placing the burden of overcoming administrative inertia 
on the banks rather than on consumers. First, bankers are the OCC’s 
natural constituency, the private parties with whom the OCC must regularly 
work and to whom the OCC is likely to be most responsive. Second, the 
banks already have data at their disposal concerning the credit-worthiness 
and borrowing behavior of consumers. Third, the agency reference theory 
gives the banks a strong incentive to demand policies specifically addressing 
the banking risks being regulated by the states: Absent such a policy, a bank 
cannot obtain the protection of preemption. Such preemption is more 
valuable to banks than to consumers because, unlike consumers, banks 
benefit from regulatory uniformity regardless of the content of a regulation. 
For any enterprise doing business in more than one state, there are scale 
economies in operating under a single, nationwide set of rules, because the 
costs of compliance (e.g., researching rules, designing financial products that 
comply with the rules, and so forth) are reduced.318 
Requiring the OCC to address the risks regulated by a state law before 
preempting that state law, therefore, has the beneficial effect of prodding 
the OCC into addressing banking risks that it might otherwise ignore. State 
law, on this account, is not the final source of banking regulation, but is 
rather a catalyst for federal regulation.319 Such a prod might be especially 
necessary because, as compared with elected state officials like attorneys 
general or governors, federal regulators might be risk-averse to regulatory 
action changing the status quo.320 Such administrative action can stir up 
bankers and consumer advocates to lobby Congress to place pressure on the 
agency, for instance, through congressional committee hearings, appropria-
tions riders, and other forms of legislative harassment. For bureaucrats who 
 
318 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National 
Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 29-32 (2007) (discussing nonuniform state regulation as a 
threat to large-scale business enterprises).  
319 For examples of state law as an impetus for agency action, see generally David A. Kessler 
& David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 
96 GEO. L.J. 461, 477 (2008) (explaining that “tort law often informs regulation decisions, and the 
FDA has often acted in response to information that has come to light in state damages litigation 
after a drug has been approved” (footnote omitted)); Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra note 
312, at 2146-55. For examples of state law as an impetus for congressional action, see Hills, supra 
note 318, at 19-27.  
320 See JOEL D. ABERBACH ET AL., BUREAUCRATS AND POLITICIANS IN WESTERN DEMOC-
RACIES 102-14 (1981) (contrasting bureaucrats’ criteria for evaluating policy with those of politicians). 
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prefer the quiet life, it is simpler to take no action whatsoever on a particular 
risk than it is to support either explicit regulation or deregulation.321 
This is not to say that state law can directly interfere with the federal 
administrative process by basing legal liability under state law on private 
parties’ acts or omissions in the federal administrative process. Such direct 
state meddling with federal decisionmaking is generally prohibited.322 There 
is, however, no such ban on state laws’ complementing federal law by 
imposing liability for risks that federal agencies lack personnel or time to 
evaluate.323 State law imposes no duty on private parties to urge federal 
regulators to address risks regulated at the state level: that private action is 
an incidental (albeit happy) side-effect, not a legal requirement, of state law.  
Even if the agency reference theory constitutes good regulatory policy, it 
must also be a sound interpretation of the Dodd-Frank Act. Under section 
1044(a) of Dodd-Frank, state laws are preempted only if they violate the 
Barnett Bank standard by “impair[ing] significantly” a banking power that 
Congress “explicitly granted.”324 As suggested in Section II.C, the meaning 
of “explicitly” is ambiguous. It cannot be that any banking practice is 
“explicitly granted” simply because the practice falls within the powers 
conferred by the National Bank Act: Such a reading would be inconsistent 
with cases cited approvingly by the Barnett Bank Court, such as Luckett and 
McClellan.325 But the Barnett Bank Court never defined the degree of 
specificity of federal authorization sufficient to preempt state law. 
The agency reference theory provides a ready-made interpretation of 
what it means for federal law to “explicitly” confer a power: if either 
Congress or a federal agency explicitly considers whether existing federal 
 
321 See Wilmarth, supra note 174, at 949-53 (offering the analogous argument that state regu-
lation can provide regulatory competition that reduces the likelihood of industry capture of federal 
agencies). 
322 See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347-48 (2001) (barring a state 
law claim of a fraudulent representation made to the FDA to obtain federal approval for medical 
devices). In PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, the Court suggested, with a later “cf.” citation to Buckman, that 
states could not predicate liability on failures to communicate with the FDA. See 131 S. Ct. 2567, 
2578 (2011) (“Although requesting FDA assistance would have satisfied the manufacturers’ federal 
duty, it would not have satisfied their state tort-law duty to provide adequate labeling. State law 
demanded a safer label; it did not instruct the manufacturer to communicate with the FDA about 
the possibility of a safer label.”). 
323 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 578-79 (2009) (observing that state laws imposing 
damages on manufacturers who fail to warn about risks that emerge after drugs are placed on the 
market create “a complementary form of drug regulation” that supplements the FDA’s “limited 
resources” and “offers an additional, and important, layer of consumer protection”). 
324 Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996) (emphasis added). 
325 For Luckett, see supra notes 145-50 and accompanying text; for McClellan, see supra notes 108-
11 and accompanying text. 
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law adequately controls a particular type of risk, then federal law “explicitly” 
confers the power to engage in banking practices that create that risk. Such 
a reading reconciles the Barnett Bank Court’s holding that a 1916 statute 
explicitly granted the power to sell insurance to national banks owned by 
holding companies326 with the Luckett Court’s holding that the National 
Bank Act did not explicitly confer the power to maintain bank accounts past 
the period when they were deemed abandoned by Kentucky law.327 By 
specifically authorizing national banks to sell insurance, Congress had 
presumably considered the risks that the sellers would compete with local 
banks. After all, one cannot sell insurance without potentially depriving 
competitors of business. By contrast, Congress might authorize banks to 
maintain bank accounts without reaching any conclusion about whether or 
not such accounts should be deemed abandoned when they are inactive for 
extended periods of time after notice has been given to account holders. 
Construing “explicitly” to require some specific endorsement of a banking 
risk by either Congress or the OCC also harmonizes the substantial impair-
ment standard with section 1044(a)’s various procedural safeguards. Section 
1044(a) requires a preemption decision to be made on the basis of a “case-
by-case” determination328 of a state law’s “impact”329 on national banks, 
supported by “specific findings” that are backed by “substantial evidence.”330 
Such language meshes well with reading Barnett Bank as stressing powers 
“explicitly granted,” because these procedures require an individualized 
(“case-by-case”) evaluation of a “particular” risk addressed by state law. If 
that risk is adequately addressed by federal law, then the state law’s salutary 
“impact” is presumably gratuitous and, therefore, an “impair[ment]” of a 
national bank’s honest, safe, and sound banking practices. If, instead, federal 
law does not address the risk addressed by state law, then state law plugs a 
hole in public oversight of banking and does not “impair,” but rather 
improves, such banking. In other words, process and substance go together: 
whether federal law “explicitly grant[s]” banks the power to incur particular 
risks in disregard of a state law depends on whether some federal decision-
maker has explicitly considered the risks in question.  
Such a reading of section 1044(a) is neither required nor foreclosed by 
the statute’s text. Because section 1044(a) specifically withholds Chevron 
deference from the OCC,331 however, it remains for the courts, not the 
 
326 See id. at 33. 
327 See Anderson Nat’l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 248-52 (1944). 
328 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(3)(A)–(B) (2006, Supp. IV 2011). 
329 Id. § 25b(b)(3)(A). 
330 Id. § 25b(c). 
331 See supra text accompanying note 308. 
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OCC, to resolve the major ambiguities in the statute. The withholding of 
Chevron deference does not mean, however, that the OCC cannot receive 
any deference: the administrative process in section 1044(a) defers to the 
OCC’s consideration of the risks addressed by state law if the OCC points 
to some “substantial evidence” in the record showing that additional state 
regulation is unnecessary. Ordinary principles of administrative law also 
require that the OCC respond to contrary evidence that such risks are 
significant and unaddressed by existing federal rules with some commentary 
on the evidence’s inadequacy.332 The agency’s silence would be a recipe for 
judicial reversal, even if the court ultimately refused to weigh the agency’s 
evidence against its opponents’. 
There is some indication that some lower courts have already adopted 
such an agency reference model for preemption under section 1044(a). For 
instance, the court in In re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation found that 
the OCC’s rule expressly authorizing national banks to charge noninterest 
fees333 did not authorize them to arrange deliberately the order of posting to 
maximize the possibility of customers’ accounts being overdrawn.334 In 
reaching this holding, the court did not find decisive the OCC’s interpreta-
tion of its own rule stating that banks did not need to post withdrawals in 
the order in which they were received.335 Although the OCC’s published 
guidance specifically assumed that banks could post withdrawals in any 
order,336 the court reasoned that the guidance never stated that banks could 
do so specifically with the purpose of deceiving customers into incurring 
overdraft fees.337 Because the OCC had not addressed the issue covered by 
state law—whether banks’ self-interest in maximizing fees would produce 
the right balance of overdraft protection given the low probability that 
consumers would monitor the risks of overdraft—the court assumed that the 
OCC’s rule on posting did not preempt the state law.338 
The Checking Account Overdraft Litigation decision comports with those 
of other lower courts in allowing states to regulate banking risks when their 
regulations take the form of general common law theories of liability not 
 
332 See supra note 255 and accompanying text. 
333 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002(a) (2012). 
334 In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1313-14 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
335 Id. at 1312-13. 
336 For instance, the Guidance urged that, as a best practice, banks should “[c]learly explain 
to consumers that transactions may not be processed in the order in which they occurred, and that 
the order in which transactions are received by the institution and processed can affect the total 
amount of overdraft fees incurred by the consumer.” Joint Guidance on Overdraft Protection 
Programs, 70 Fed. Reg. 9127, 9132 (Feb. 24, 2005). 
337 See Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 694 F. Supp. 2d at 1313-14. 
338 Id. 
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especially targeted at the business of banking. Where state laws take the 
form of banking-specific regulations, lower courts still find that such laws 
are preempted, even absent any specific findings that compliance with the 
law would be especially burdensome for the bank.339 That lower courts 
continue to treat general and banking-specific state laws differently for 
purposes of preemption, even after section 1044(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act 
was enacted, illustrates the persistence of McCulloch’s hold on the judicial 
mind. As explained in Section III.A above, the distinction between states’ 
general and banking-specific laws makes no sense in terms of market 
harmonization, minimization of banks’ compliance costs, protection of 
banking consumers, or any other conceivable goal of federal banking law. It 
lives on only as a sort of doctrinal ghost haunting the doctrine long after its 
justification has passed away.  
Fortunately, the benefits of the agency reference theory can be realized 
even if the courts insist on distinguishing between general and banking-
specific state laws. If stare decisis leads courts to honor McCulloch’s distinc-
tion between banking-specific rules and more general rules, courts can still 
refuse to find preemption of state common law liability unless the OCC 
evaluates the specific risks addressed by such liability. Such a barrier to 
preemption would still induce banks to petition the OCC for clarifications 
of federal banking law regarding the proper regulation of such specific risks. 
Because, as noted above in Section III.A, virtually any banking-specific rule 
can be reframed as a common law theory not especially targeted at banking 
practices, such a barrier to preemption would accomplish much if not all 
that completely overruling McCulloch would accomplish. 
B. Presuming Preemption on Functional Grounds:  
A Presumption Against States’ Protectionism and  
Expropriation of National Banks’ Investments 
The argument for requiring the OCC to evaluate a risk before preempting 
state laws that regulate that risk does not require any blanket “anti-
preemption” canon. Federal agencies and federal courts have good reasons 
to be suspicious of state regulations of nationally chartered banks, because 
these regulations are likely the products of the political dysfunction to which 
state legislature are prone. In particular, protectionism and expropriation 
are two dangers that a presumption in favor of preemption might usefully 
 
339 See, e.g., Parks v. MBNA America Bank, 278 P.3d 1193, 1203-04 (Cal.) (holding that disclo-
sure requirements for convenience checks were preempted as a matter of law, even absent any proof 
that requirements imposed compliance burdens on banks), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 653 (2012). 
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combat, while imposing very little burden on the useful “prodding” function 
of state law described above. 
First, consider the dangers of protectionism through the lens of the facts 
of Barnett Bank itself. The state law at issue in Barnett was a Florida statute 
prohibiting affiliates of national holding companies from selling insurance 
in small towns in Florida while allowing small-town bankers to peddle such 
insurance.340 The state law was, in short, blatantly protectionist. Moreover, 
the Florida law undermined a 1916 federal statute authorizing nationally 
chartered banks to sell insurance on the same terms as any other firm 
“authorized by the authorities of the State . . . to do business [there].”341 To 
construe the 1916 federal statute as exempting the Florida statute from 
preemption simply because the latter did not single out national banks 
would gut the federal law of its obvious purpose—the suppression of state 
protectionism in favor of small town bankers and against larger-scale 
institutions.  
Such protectionism is the first circumstance in which, on functional 
grounds, courts ought to adopt a presumption in favor of preemption. Small 
bankers are likely to have exceptional networks of organization in the state 
legislatures. Voters are unlikely to scrutinize their labors on behalf of 
obscure regulatory schemes that exclude competitors while providing scale 
economies in finance. When a federal law seems, therefore, to be directed at 
unlocking a local market for financial services that state laws keep closed, 
courts ought to suspend their deference toward the latter and give the 
former broad scope to operate outside its literal terms. 
Opposition to protectionism can explain the result in decisions finding 
preemption even where such opposition does not explicitly appear in the 
courts’ reasoning in those decisions. In Franklin National Bank of Franklin 
Square v. New York, for instance, the Court held that the National Bank 
Act’s grant of incidental advertising powers preempted a New York statute 
prohibiting banks “from using the word ‘saving’ or ‘savings’ in their adver-
tising or business.”342 The statute applied only to banks not chartered by the 
State of New York: On its face and in its stated purpose, the goal of the 
statute was to protect New York’s own chartered savings banks and savings 
and loan associations from competition by commercial banks by helping 
consumers distinguish between the two types of institutions.343 Franklin 
found preemption based on the general idea that advertising was “one of the 
 
340 Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 28-29 (1996). 
341 Id. at 28 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1994)). 
342 347 U.S. 373, 374 (1954). 
343 See id. 
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most usual and useful of weapons” in banking, such that the Court could not 
accept “that the incidental powers granted to national banks should be 
construed so narrowly as to preclude the use of advertising in any branch of 
their authorized business.”344 The Court did not, however, explain why this 
state limit on incidental powers was distinct from myriad other state laws 
with which national banks had to comply. The protectionist character of the 
preempted state law, however, supplies an answer to this question. Unlike, 
say, a general ban on false advertising, New York’s actual regulation was 
explicable only in protectionist terms. 
Even when a state law does not facially discriminate against nonresident 
or nationally chartered banks, courts may infer a protectionist purpose from 
a severe protectionist effect. In U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Schipper, for 
instance, the district court held that the National Bank Act preempted an 
Iowa law requiring anyone providing a central routing unit (CRU) for ATM 
transactions to appoint consumer, business, and agricultural representatives 
to the CRU’s policymaking body.345 According to the court, Iowa’s law 
“effectively prohibited” national banks “from providing CRU services” to 
any state-chartered credit unions unless the banks restructured their boards 
of directors to comply with Iowa’s representation rules.346 So effective was 
Iowa’s law that only one company had been approved by the Iowa adminis-
trator to act as a CRU for all of Iowa.347 Such stark exclusionary effects are 
signals of likely protectionist purpose that do not require hypersensitive 
judicial antennae to detect. The Schipper court did not rely on these exclu-
sionary effects to find that Iowa’s law was preempted; instead, it noted only 
that CRU services were “incidental” banking powers under the National 
Bank Act that Iowa could not significantly impair.348 
Preemption doctrine should also discourage states’ desire to expropriate 
nationally charted banks’ sunk assets. San Francisco’s effort to prohibit 
banks from charging for the use of ATM machines in the early 2000s stands 
as the classic example of recent state anti-banking expropriation. In striking 
down this measure, the Ninth Circuit recited the usual rhetoric about 
nationally chartered banks being federal instrumentalities that state law 
 
344 Id. at 377. 
345 See 812 F. Supp. 2d 963, 973 (S.D. Iowa 2011) (“[T]he provisions in the Iowa [law] that 
prevent or significantly interfere with U.S. Bank’s ability to provide [central routing unit] services 
are preempted by federal law.”). 
346 Id. at 972-73.  
347 Id. at 966. 
348 Id. at 973. 
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could not touch.349 This rhetoric, taken literally, is either formalistic or simply 
untrue: state common law imposes a myriad of legal duties on national 
banks that lower courts universally uphold. The better functional justifica-
tion for a strong norm of preemption, however, is that imposing price 
controls on fees charged by banks for the use of their physical infrastructure 
looks like an effort to expropriate prior investments for self-defeating 
populist ends. Those ends are self-defeating because such price controls 
discourage the very investments that the locality seeks to exploit. Moreover, 
the ban on ATM fees cannot be justified as an effort to protect consumers 
from charges about which they are likely to be ignorant: to the contrary, an 
ATM machine gives customers ample warning of the precise charges the 
bank imposes before the consumers consummate their transactions. 
Why distrust state efforts at expropriation? The functional, as opposed 
to formal, reason is that states are locked into the sovereign’s dilemma: they 
seek to encourage investments by giving assurances that those investments 
will be respected, but absent an enforcement mechanism by some higher 
sovereign, they cannot credibly commit to honor their own assurances. The 
Constitution’s Contracts350 and Takings351 Clauses can be viewed as efforts 
to overcome the sovereign’s dilemma. By protecting investment-backed 
expectations and the sovereign’s contractual commitments, the Clauses free 
subnational governments from the risk premiums that wary investors would 
otherwise charge. It is no favor for robust federalism to “liberate” sub-
national governments from such constraints. Banking preemption can 
supplement such doctrines by barring price controls that serve no function 
other than to expropriate preexisting infrastructure like ATM machines.  
CONCLUSION 
It has been almost two hundred years since the Supreme Court held in 
McCulloch that nationally chartered banks, as federal instrumentalities, must 
enjoy presumptive autonomy from state law. Controversial when it was 
handed down, Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion has long outlived the 
historical period of which it is a creature. Treating a corporation, chartered by 
 
349 See Bank of Am. v. City & County of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 561 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(“National Banks are ‘instrumentalit[ies] of the federal government, created for a public purpose, 
and . . . subject to the paramount authority of the United States.’” (alterations in original) 
(quoting Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 308 
(1978))). 
350 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obliga-
tion of Contracts . . . .”). 
351 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”). 
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Congress to be the federal government’s exclusive fiscal agent, as a federal 
agency entitled to set banking policy without further governmental over-
sight was plausible, albeit hotly contested, before the Civil War. Such an 
assumption, however, becomes completely untenable when federally char-
tered banks are instead thousands of self-interested private enterprises with 
no duties to act as Congress’s special fiscal agent. 
There is no reason to treat such enterprises differently from any other 
businesses insofar as preemption is concerned. Where federal law provides 
some rule by which a banking practice is to be governed, then that rule 
should trump contrary state law. Moreover, given the needs of the financial 
sector operating in a multistate market, one might even presume that those 
federal rules trump any additional state regulation addressing the same risk 
as federal law. But if there is no federal rule governing some banking 
activity, then state law should, by default, govern that activity.  
Indeed, no one—not Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch itself, nor the 
OCC, nor the national banks—contests that some state law must govern 
such transactions for which federal law provides no rule. Even if disuniform 
law is bad, anarchy is worse. Banking cannot survive without laws defining 
contracts, property, crimes, and other matters on which commerce depends. 
The error of the OCC is to assume that such general state laws can be 
usefully distinguished from state laws specifically addressed to banking, on 
the theory that only the former supply the “infrastructure” for banking 
operations with which the latter interfere. 
McCulloch distinguished taxes on banking operations from general prop-
erty taxes on the ground that the former constituted an attack on federal 
supremacy. Once one abandons the assumption that national banks’ policy 
choices represent the presumptive policies of the federal government, then 
this supremacy-based argument for drawing diffuse lines between laws 
defining legal “infrastructure” and other sorts of state laws disappears. 
Instead, all state law serves the goal of filling gaps in federal law until the 
relevant federal regulator gets around to supplying a substitute federal rule. 
Rather than allow banks selectively to disregard state laws that address 
banking risks the OCC has ignored, it is both wiser and more consistent 
with ordinary preemption doctrine for the OCC to evaluate the risks 
addressed by the states and to address those risks with consciously adopted 
federal policies. 
